More recently Anshel Pfeffer, a columnist of the Ha’aretz newspaper, argues that the fast of the 10th month would eventually come to an end, and with the other fast days[1], will become transformed into days of feasting and happiness (Zech 8:19).

Pfeffer writes:

“Changed attitudes by God and Israel prompted a question: What is the need for all these fasts? There was none. Instead of having fasts to remember all the bad moments in their history, God instructed them to have joyful feasts. In other words, the fasts were to be turned to feasts and occasions of joy. “The fast … shall be to the house of Judah joy and gladness, and cheerful feasts; therefore, love the truth and peace” (8:19). The horrors of the fall of Jerusalem, the burning of the Temple, and other calamities would drift into obscurity as joy flooded their hearts through the manifold mercies of the Lord . . . ”

One must ask: Have we in our own day realized this ancient biblical prophecy? Well, in a word: yes and no. The Jewish return to her ancestral homeland is indeed one of the most remarkable chapters of Jewish history–both ancient and modern–and logically one could make the case that Tisha’ B’Av has finally fulfilled its purpose. However, the fact remains that the Third Temple has not yet been built, and given the draconian attitude of the Haredi (Ultra-Orthodox and Hassidic leadership), one can safely conclude that the Third Temple will not be built any time in the near or distant future.

Exile is more than just a brute physical fact, it is a way of thinking; unfortunately, our spiritual healthiness today reflects a religious community that is at odds within itself. The recent attempt to delegitimize the Diaspora Jewish community only proves that there are many obstacles that prevent us from truly fulfilling the biblical passages cited above.  When Jews attack and destroy synagogues in Israel as the Haredi did earlier this year with the Intel building just because this gentile business remained open on Shabbat, we have a serious problem that all Jews must earnestly address.

Hurling stones on Shabbat in the holy city of Jerusalem reflects a spiritual disease of intolerance that is far deadlier to the Jewish people than all the missiles shot by the Palestinians in Gaza or from Lebanon. The Talmud (BT Gittin 55b-57a) describes how the zealots purposely burned the food silos rather than make a truce with the Romans, killing anyone who got in their way. When we watch how the Haredim are behaving in Israel today, joining forces with the Palestinians who wish to uproot the Jewish presence altogether, we must wonder whether we have sunk to a new historical low.  

How can we as a “chosen people” bear witness to our unique vocation when in reality, we are doing everything to rip our nation apart? The religious fanaticism that propelled our ancestors to fight against Rome ended in the destruction of our homeland. The real enemies of the Jewish people proved to be–not the Romans–but Jews who acted violently toward their own fellow Jewish citizens.

Rabbinic wisdom in the Talmud and subsequent texts explains how “sin’at hinnum” (gratuitous hatred) resulted in the exile of our people; the real question we must ask is: Have we learned any wisdom from the mistakes of our forbearers?

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Notes:

[1] Of course, one might ask: What other fast days was the prophet Zechariah referring to? Simply put, the fast of the fifth month marked the tragic destruction of the temple on the seventeenth day (2 Kgs 25:8). The other subsidiary events were included under the greater (cf. 8:19): the ninth day of the fourth month is recorded as the date when the city wall was breached (Jer. 39:2); the fast of the seventh month commemorated the murder of Gedaliah (2 Kgs 25:25; Jer. 41:1f.), and the tenth day of the tenth month marked the beginning of Nebuchadrezzar’s siege of the city (2 Kgs 25:1, 2; Jer. 39:1) These special days had become hallowed by observance for over sixty years

Apologists for religion often contend that a belief in God is necessary in order for people to act morally, but an examination of rabbinic texts suggest that the early rabbinic teachers acknowledged that had the Torah never been given to Israel–or by extension, to human kind–primitive man would have had to learn morality from the animal world.

The Sages appear to have understood this truth as well, for they candidly said, “If the Torah had not been given we could have learnt modesty from the cat, honesty from the ant, chastity from the dove, and good manners from the cock who first coaxes and then mates”(BT Eruvin 100b).

While the Talmud delineates the positive traits humankind could have learned from nature, it goes without saying that our ancestors could just as easily have learned many negative character traits from nature, e.g., from the ant we would have derived the principles of totalitarianism; from the cat we would have developed certain predatory traits showing no mercy toward the weak and defenseless such as a male lion’s tendency to destroy his offspring; from the chicken, our ancestors might have learned how to be scavengers who prefer to live in filthy habitats, and so on.

Biologist Lyall Watson sees a mutual affinity between human and animal behavior. Watson once observed a group of young penguins standing on the edge of an ice floe, learning how to swim. Fearful that there might be a leopard seal lurking in the murky waters, the penguins stood their ground and refused to go into the water. As thousands of penguins crowded on the floe, some pushing occurred from the back of the ranks until one of the penguins slipped into the water. After the lone penguin entered the water, a leopard-seal suddenly appeared and ate the small creature.

Reticent, the other penguins backed off until eventually, the group pushed another one of its members into the water. Sure enough, the leopard-seal reappeared and swallowed the second penguin as well. The same process occurred again, and by the fourth time, apparently, the leopard-seal had eaten enough and the fourth penguin was left safe and sound. Afterwards, the entire penguin group jumped in and enjoyed the swimming as if they hadn’t a care in the world. From this incident, Watson deduced that selfishness and cowardice are not just human traits; there are many other species of animals that share these qualities as well.

Yes, nature seems to have a sense of morality that is not much different from our own, but unlike the other denizens of nature, human beings have the ability to reprogram their mental and spiritual orientation toward the existence of other beings. Religion can facilitate this process of ethical transformation, but it is not necessarily a given. Living the religious lifestyle does not guarantee moral development.

Derech Eretz and Morality

On the other hand, the Sages also advocated a different attitude that is worth considering: “Derech eretz comes before Torah” (Midrash Vayikra Rabbah 9:3), which suggests that human decency is a precondition to the Israelites receiving the Ten Commandments at Mt. Sinai. Without this type of natural morality, for which the Golden Rule is based upon–no morality is possible. As Levinas as pointed out many times, God never commanded Cain not to commit murder against his brother; the moral law is engraved upon the human soul and does not have to derive from a standard of morality that is outside of humankind.

When we observe the moral breakdown in religious-based societies, one can only conclude that religion does not magically transform people; but the love of virtue and goodness can achieve such a goal.

(More to come)

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‘So long as the rabbinic court keeps a black list of mamzerim and it’s the only institution officially allowed to marry Jews in the State of Israel – we all partners in the crime of hurting persons who have committed no crime.’ Rivkah Lubitch calls to get rid of the rabbinic court’s black list

Published:  04.13.10, 15:19 / Israel Jewish Scene

In a book by Daphne du Maurier there’s a description of a horrible ceremony that took place nearly six hundred years ago in England. It involved a woman who “violated” the dignity of her husband when she had sexual relations with another man after she had already been widowed (Yes yes. You read right. She had sex with a man after the death of her husband!).

From the story it becomes clear that the woman was compelled to undergo the ceremony lest she lose all rights to her husband’s property. In other words: Either she took part in the ceremony and was allowed to continue living in her home, or she was thrown into the street. At the humiliating ceremony, the woman confessed her sins in detail to the priest and blood thirsty crowd. This is the way it worked: The woman was stripped to her waist and her hair was cut. She was then poised on a black sheep that she rode for a not insignificant distance to the laughter of the mob that gathered to witness and be forewarned. The woman rode on the sheep for about a hundred yards from the place of the ceremony. Then she was forced to dismount the sheep and crawl on her knees till she reached the priest. She then confessed her sins to the priest, who, in an act of grace, offered her absolution.

Seem familiar? We have something similar – the wayward woman (sotah), suspected by her husband of having sex with another man, is brought before the High Priest in the Temple Gate. Her hair is unraveled and her clothes let loose as she faces the curious crowd who comes each day to watch the spectacle. But it’s an old story and doesn’t happen today. We’re not like that.

But even today there are ways to maintain the honor of men. We know well how to punish a woman who violates the honor of her husband by having sex — we ostracize her child forever.

We punish her children in such a way that the woman will remember and never forget who sets the rules of the game, and what those rules are. Already in the womb, we turn the fetus conceived of the forbidden union into a type of monster. A creature who would have been better off never coming into this world. We label the child a “mamzer” and ostracize him or her forever. No mercy. No forgiveness. No repentance. No cure. S/He gets the ultimate punishment – social ostracism forever.

The personal is political. What a woman does in private is the business of the entire Jewish world, the laws of the State of Israel and its citizens for generations. So long as the rabbinic court keeps a black list of mamzerim and it’s the only institution officially allowed to marry Jews in the State of Israel – we all partners in the crime of hurting persons who have committed no crime. Don’t say that you didn’t know. Stop sticking your head in the ground. The State of Israel and the halacha have collaborated to harm innocent people. We need to work together to solve the problem and get rid of the black list for good.

Rivkah Lubitch works at the Center for Women’s Justice , Tel: 02-5664390

I came across an interesting article at the failedmessiah website today that was written by one of the most creative Orthodox rabbinic scholars today, Professor Marc B. Shapiro. I thought it would be intriguing to focus a little bit on this question, primarily because the problem continues to grow within the Haredi community.

He writes:

“…There is another theory as to why the sectarian hasidic world in particular has had so many cases of covering up and defending child sex abusers. It is that they simply do not regard these people as so terrible. The evidence for this appears obvious, in that in case of after case we see that they continue to allow sex abusers to teach and refuse to turn them over to the authorities and warn the parent body. Had they caught the rebbe eating at McDonald’s, you can be sure he would have been fired, but not so when it comes to fooling around with kids. The question is why do they have this outlook, and how come they don’t regard child sex abusers as so terrible? Here is a possible answer (which a wise person suggested). Look at where these societies get their information about human nature, the information that they regard as authentic and true. It does not come from modern psychology, but from Torah sources and folk beliefs. If you look only at traditional rabbinic literature, you won’t conclude that child sex abuse is as terrible as modern society views it. Yes, it is a sin and the person who commits it must repent as he must do with all sins, but there is nothing in the traditional literature that speaks to the great trauma suffered by the victim. How do we know about this trauma? Only from modern psychology and the testimony of the victims. Yet this type of evidence does not have much significance in the insular hasidic world (unless it is your own child who has been abused). Certainly modern psychology, which is often attacked by figures in that community, is not given much credence, especially not when they are confronted with an issur (prohibition) of mesirah (informing upon Jews to the secular authorities). This theory makes a lot of sense to me and I am curious to hear what others have to say.”

Is the professor correct?

It is written in the Mishnah: “A girl of three years and one day is betrothed (as a woman is acquired) by intercourse…if one of those forbidden to have relations with her according to the Torah does have relations with her, he is killed because of her, and she is exempt. If she is younger than that, (less than three years and a day), it is as one who sticks a finger in the eye” [1]

Maimonides similarly rules:

“When an adult male enters into relations with any of the women forbidden in connection with the above transgressions who is three years and one day old or more, he is liable for execution, koreth (“excision,” i.e.,  premature death or spiritual death in the hereafter) or lashes and she is not liable unless she is past majority. If she is younger than this, both participants are not liable, for the act is not considered as sexual relations.”

Note that neither the Talmud nor Maimonides prescribes lashes for sexually molesting a young infant girl under the age of three. This law shows how antiquated the ancient world looked upon this type of behavior; it also explains why little stigma was placed on adults who sexually abuse children in this way.

Maimonides continues: “Similarly, when an adult woman enters into sexual relations with a minor, if he is nine years and one day old, she is liable for execution, koreth, or lashes and he is not liable. If he is younger than nine years old, they are both free of liability.” [2]

Here too, it is not enough to simply state that such behavior is “free of liability,” corporeal punishment would have been a much more apropos way for a medievalist like Maimonides to rule. Note, however, only if it is a male child who violated at a young age, Maimonides recommends that corporeal punishment be administered! He writes further:

“If a minor of nine years and a day or more is involved, the man who enters into relations or has the minor enter into relations with him should be stoned and the minor is not liable. If the male minor was less than nine years old, they are both free of liability. It is, however, appropriate for the court to subject the adult to stripes for rebellious conduct for homosexual relations  although his companion was less than nine years old.” [3]

In defense of the ancients, they simply did not realize the evils of pedophilia like we do today—plain and simple. The study of human psychology hardly existed in the rabbinic world as a discipline like it is today.

Thus far, Professor Shapiro is certainly correct. However, there is a more basic explanation that deserves consideration.

The Haredi attitude and thinking really believes that revealing sexual scandals about its inner circle constitute a far greater sin than a specific incident of pedophilia. The same phenomena can be seen whenever there is also a spousal abuse, or child abuse–especially when it results in the wrongful death of a child.

Simply put, the Haredi leadership is terrified that their religious world could unravel. As is often the case with family dysfunction, keeping secrets about its sordid behavior is vital in order to maintain the “appearance” of normalcy. I would argue that the tendency to look for newer stringent decrees in Halachic minutia reflects a desperate psychological attempt to mask their more insidious problems. After all, it is much easier to worry about bugs in lettuce or schach than it is to deal with the real hard issues that confront their society like pedophilia and child abuse.

As with the case of the famous story of the “Emperor’s New Clothes,” the Haredi rabbinic leaders would much rather act as if everything is really “normal” in their society, but unfortunately, it is not. Once the Haredi communities adopt a zero-tolerance approach like the Catholic Church seems to be trying, I believe they will have taken one major step in solving this terrible moral disease that has infested their yeshivas and homes.

With respect to the Catholic Church, the Pontiff missed a golden opportunity when his associates failed to define pedophilia as a “mortal sin.”  Religious leaders need to take ownership of their sins of omission/commission,  cowardice, and apathy. Our hands will never be collectively clean until we protect society’s most defenseless citizens and victims.

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Notes:

[1] Mishnah Niddah 5:4.

[2] Maimonides, MT, Laws of Forbidden Intercourse 1:13

[3] Ibid, Halacha 14.

As most of our readers probably know, in order for an animal to be considered “clean,” it must either (1) chew its cud, or (2) have split hooves. Inevitably, anyone reading the Bible will find the classification of the hare in particular to be problematical. Before going into further detail, let us for the moment forensically examine the terminology of the Torah and compare it to the Septuagint’s translation. Why the Septuagint? Possibly because this work reflects some of the oldest traditions we have of the biblical animals. Of course, the Septuagint is not beyond making errors in its translation–but that is certainly not the case here!

The Septuagint renders אַרְנֶ֗בֶת (‘arnebet) χοιρογρύλλιον (chiorogryllios = “hare”).  But is the biblical classification indeed zoologically correct? Neither the hyrax or hare possess four stomachs; nor do they ruminate. Sensing the difficulties in maintaining such an untenable position, Israeli botanist Prof. Yehuda Felix explains:

Several years ago in Tradition, an author proposed that the word shafan in the Torah referred to various types of llamas; and that the arnevet should be identified with the Baletrian (two-humped) camel. However, such identifications have no philological foundation, excepting the fact that these animals do not chew their cud or have split hoofs. The author of the article claims that Moses was told by God that thousands of years after receiving the Torah there would be Jews living on the South American continent and so he warned them not to eat the llama.

Felix went on to say that such conjectures were not only unreasonable, they lacked a philological basis that is  acceptable to scientific identification. Prof. Felix  is certainly accurate, for many of the cognate languages of the ancient NE, all refer to the hare. The אַרְנֶ֗בֶת corresponds to the Arabic Karnab and the Old Southern Arabic Krnb as well as the Akkadian arnabu and annabu. In each of these languages, there is no doubt that the Torah is speaking of the hare.

Felix further adds, it is clear that the biblical text was referring to animals native to the Land of Israel and known in Bible times. However, all this still makes our original question more potent: How does one answer the problem posed by modern zoology? Prof. Felix contends that the Torah is merely speaking in terms of how human beings commonly perceive the hare when observing its eating habits. He further writes:

“The hare is not a ruminant. There have been attempts to explain the Torah’s definition of the arnevet as a cud-chewer due to the similarity in its chewing movements to those of ruminants (this explanation was given about the shafan as well). This is an oversimplified explanation. A better one may be as follows: in our generation we have learned that the local hares of the genus called lepus are accustomed to eating a large amount of greens each morning. These are only partially digested and the remnants are excreted in the form of balls on a flat, open surface lacking vegetation. These balls are left for a time on the open surface and later the hare returns to chew them, after these greens have undergone a process of chemical breakdown caused by bacteria.” [1]

Anyone who sees a hare chewing food in a place where no vegetation exists might think that the hare is chewing its cud. Remember: “The Torah speaks in the language of man,” i.e., from the perspective of an ancient Israelite who had no scientific concept of taxonomy.

What is striking about the above species, it seems that although the hare and the rock badger do not zoologically possess even one “clean” sign, it is sufficient that it merely appear to have a clean sign in order to be considered as having one of the two “clean” criteria.

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Notes:

[1] “Hare” Encyclopedia of Judaica (electronic ed.).

Was Moses speaking  metaphorically? Or was he being quite literal? Rashbam chose the former possibility: The Torah exhorts that your devotion to God should be so ever constant, it should be as though your love were literally inscribed upon your hand:“Set me as a seal on your heart, as a seal on your arm” (Song 8:6) [1]  One 19th century exegete observed:

“Is not this an allusion to an ancient and general custom observed in almost every part of the world? When a person wishes to remember a thing of importance, and is afraid to trust to the common operations of memory, he ties a knot on some part of his clothes, or a cord on his hand or finger, or places something out of its usual order, and in view, that his memory may be whetted to recollection, and his eye affect his heart. God, who knows how slow of heart we are to understand, graciously orders us to make use of every help, and through the means of things sensible, to rise to things spiritual.”

Commenting on Exodus 13:9, Ibn Ezra takes umbrage with the a view found among the Karaite expositors (as well as Rashbam) who also interpreted that “Bind them as a sign on your hand” is meant metaphorically and is similar to “Bind them upon your heart always; tie them around your neck.” (Prov. 6:21). By the same token, “fix them as an emblem on your forehead,“ is similar to “Let faithful love and constancy never leave you: tie them round your neck, write them on the tablet of your heart” (Prov. 3:3).  Strangely, Ibn Ezra seemed to think that metaphor plays a primary role in the Book of Proverbs, but plays virtually no role in this particular passage! History records how Ibn Ezra actually met Rashbam, and, evidently, they did not get along. Rashbam loved metaphor interpretations more than he did literal ones.

Like Ibn Ezra, most rabbinic commentaries view this verse quite literally, and argue that it refers to the tradition better known as tephillin (“phylacteries”). Tephillin consists of two little squared leather boxes that are tied to the forearms and forehead which are faithfully warn by traditional Jews every day barring the Sabbath and the biblical holidays.

There are  four Scriptural passages that  signify three basic themes: (1) the importance of accepting God as the only Deity—to the exclusion of all other deities (Deut. 6:5-9) (2) remembering the Exodus (Exod. 13:1-10; 13:11-16); (3) the acceptance of yoke of God’s commandments (Deut. 11:13-21). Among the Jews of Qumran, their tephillin included the Ten Commandments.

The term “phylacteries” has a fascinating history that describes the evolution of the daily practice of “donning tephillin” which traditional Jews still observe to this day. Originally, the pagans of antiquity wore a special head band made of leather which had special inscriptions on their heads. This headband served as an amulet. Approximately 2100 years ago, Jews adopted this practice but altered the design and purpose of the amulet to serve as a means of conveying monotheism.  This has always been the genius of Judaism–its ability to redefine the traditions it encountered, e.g., the mezuzah. However, the Sages of the Septuagint still preserved the name which reflected this humble origin.

Solomon’s wisdom is well-known. In 1 Kings 3:16-28, two new mothers approach Solomon, bringing with them one dead baby, and one live one. Each mother presents the same story and accusation: She and the other woman live together and have both recently given birth to two baby boys. One night, soon after the birth of their respective infants, the other woman woke to find that she had smothered her own baby in her sleep. In anguish and jealousy, she took her dead son and exchanged it with the other mother’s child. The following morning, the woman discovered the dead baby, and soon realized that it was not her own son, but was the other woman’s instead.

After some deliberation, King Solomon calls for a sword to be brought before him. He declares that there is only one fair solution: the live son must be split in two, each woman receiving half of the child. Upon hearing this terrible verdict, the boy’s true mother cries out, “Please, My Lord, give her the live child—do not kill him!” However, the envious mother exclaims, “It shall be neither mine nor yours—divide it!” The identity of the real mother was obvious. Solomon instantly gives the live baby to the real mother, realizing that the true mother’s instincts were to protect her child, while the liar revealed that she did not truly love the child.[1]

Early rabbinic folklore records that  once there was a two-headed man lived in the time of King Solomon who fathered six normal children. He sired a seventh child who had two heads just like himself. After the father died, the son with two heads came before King Solomon demanding a double share of the inheritance. King Solomon covered one head and poured hot water on the other. and both mouths cried out: “We are dying, we are dying! We are but one, not two.” Solomon decided that the double-headed son was after all only a single being. From this experience, King Solomon proved that two heads are not necessarily better than one with respect to receiving a double inheritance! [2]

Two Modern Cases

Here are a couple of modern cases that would have puzzled even one as great as King Solomon!

In August, 2000, a British court allowed an operation to separate Siamese twins. The conjoined twins, named, Mary and Jodie, were joined at their lower abdomens, with their heads at the opposite ends of their merged bodies and their legs emerging at right angles from each side. They shared just one heart and one pair of lungs.  After birth, it became clear that both girls would die within months if they were not separated. Any operation to separate them would kill the weaker twin Mary, who depended entirely on Jodie for her blood.  However, by “killing” Mary, Jodie would have a better chance of surviving.

Being devout Catholics, the parents refused to allow their children to be separated; they accepted the circumstances as God’s will ; they were prepared to let the babies die. Incidentally, this position was later endorsed by the Catholic Church. In September, a British court overruled the objections of the parents and ordered that the operation be performed and so, on November 6, the physicians surgically separated the twins. Mary died on the operating table.

This is not the first time this difficult moral dilemma has occurred. In September 1977, Siamese twins were born to a prominent rabbinic family in Lakewood, New Jersey. The children were taken to Children’s Hospital in Philadelphia, where Dr. C. Everett Koop (who would later went on to become the Surgeon General of the United States) soon realized that if the operation was to be performed, it would mean that the life of the weaker child, referred to as “Baby A” would have to be sacrificed so that “Baby B” would have a chance to survive.

The hospital administration was concerned with the legal and ethical ramifications of the case, as everyone tried to find a way to resolve this dilemma.  At that time, the parents turned to Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (1895-1986), who was once regarded as one of the most highly respected Halachic authorities in the 20th century. As a man of great personal piety and integrity, his  guidance was beyond reproach. The parents went to him to render a legal decision.

At first Rabbi Feinstein wondered they were dealing with “one human being,” but it was clear that since there were two brains and two nervous systems, ergo, they were two separate human beings.  Two weeks later, after reflection and repeated consultations with the medical staff, Rabbi Feinstein issued a ruling allowing the operation. [3] Rabbi Feinstein observed that there are two primary issues in deciding this question; one is the propriety of sacrificing one life for the sake of saving many others, and the second is how one defines the concept of “self defense.”

The Talmud establishes that one may not commit murder for self preservation. If a person  threatens another,“Kill so-and-so, or else I will kill you ” the person ordered to kill should sooner let himself be killed than become a murderer. All lives have equal value, and “how do you know your blood is redder than his; maybe his blood is redder than yours. [4] By killing in order to save his own life, the killer presumed that his life has greater importance than the person he killed–which from  God’s perspective may prove to be completely unwarranted!

This difference of opinion is of great relevance to the case of the conjoined twins.“Baby A,” reasoned the elderly rabbi,  had no independent ability to survive. Her entire survival depended upon “Baby B,” who had the circulatory system to back up the heart and liver’s functioning. If both will die without the operation, and one could survive with the operation, it is as though “Baby A”, the weaker child, has been “selected” for death, because she is certain to die.[5]

Rabbi Feinstein finally decided the case based on the law of the rodef (“pursuer”). There are times when the Torah allows a person to use lethal force–when it comes to matters of self-defense. In addition, an outsider observing the altercation has an obligation to use lethal force in order to save the life of the victim (e.g., a policeman shooting a robber). The Talmud says that even if the aggressor is too young to understand his actions, he is still considered a “pursuer.” However, there is an important exception.

At any rate, Rabbi Feinstein felt that it is still possible for the unborn child to be considered a “pursuer”, because each the mother in travail whose life is endangered and the infant struggling to be born are in a real sense, mutually threatening one to the other. Even in the absence of malice, circumstances can produce a situation that is analogous to the “pursuer.”

Contrarian Perspectives

Verily, not all rabbinical scholars agree that this logic is compelling. The first Chief Sephardic Rabbi of Palestine, Rabbi Ben Tzion Uziel (1880-1953) reasoned that since the Talmud considered childbirth a perfectly natural act, the baby could not be considered a “pursuer” for the dangers that exist here are generated from God. Rabbi Uziel argued that one cannot say that a baby is “pursuing” its mother to kill her since the baby is merely a participant in the miracle we call birth. Since the baby has no animus toward the mother, it may not be put to death once it has a life of its own, i.e., after the baby sees the light of day.[6]

But how do we apply this controversy with the above case of the co-joined twins? Could  the weaker twin, “Baby A” be considered a “pursuer” in relation to “Baby B”?  At first blush, it depends on which Halachic view you follow. If you accept the opinion of Rabbi Ben Tsion Uziel, then you must say that natural circumstances can’t categorize someone as a “pursuer.”

Let us suggest an alternative approach to Rabbi Uziel’s position. Had the question of co-joined twins been asked to Rabbi Uziel, he might have ruled that the operations were necessary – but not because of the  “pursuer” argument advocated by Rabbi Feinstein, but for an altogether different Halachic principle: pikuah nefesh – the imperative to save a life.” If nothing were to be done, both children would certainly die, but the physician has the imperative to save whatever life he can, and since the more viable child had a greater chance, “Baby B’s” life takes precedence over “Baby A.”

From this viewpoint, it becomes more a matter of practicality – the infant who has a greater grasp on life takes priority.  In other words, this is essentially a principle of what is known as “triage”. As a process, triage is used for sorting injured people into groups based on their need for or likely benefit from immediate medical treatment. Triage is used on the battlefield, at disaster sites, and in hospital emergency rooms when limited medical resources must be allocated. [7]

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Notes:

[1] It is intriguing to speculate why the Solomonic passage has omitted in a famous Mishnaic case pertaining to two disputants who made a maximalist claim on a lost property that was discovered. The Mishnah in Bava Metzia — 1:1 reads:

Two [in court] lay hold of a garment—this one says, “I discovered it!”—And that one says, “I discovered it!”—This one says, “It’s all mine!”—And that one says, “It’s all mine!”— This one takes an oath that he has no less a share of it than half, and that one takes an oath that he has no less a share of it than half. And they divide it up. This  one says, “It’s all mine!” And that one says, “Half of it is mine!”The one who says, “It’s all mine” takes an oath that he has no less a share of it than three parts. And the one who says, “Half of it is mine,” takes an oath that he has no less a share of it than a fourth part. This one then takes three shares, and that one takes the fourth

[2] Hibbur ha-Maʿasiyyot, No 11; BHM IV, 151–152; Maʾasiyyot (Gaster’s edition), 113, 75; Al-Barceloni, 173; Mordecai, Tefillin, who gives PRE as his source. See Gaster, Exempla, No. 113; Steinschneider. Hebräische Bibliographie, XVIII, 16, and Salzberger, Salomo-Sage, 58. Sources cited from: L. Ginzberg, Legends of the Jews (2nd ed.) (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2003 ed.), 951.

[3] See Rabbi Moshe David Tendler’s The Responsa of Rav Moshe Feinstein: Vol. I Care of the Critically Ill a Translation and Commentary (Hoboken, Ktav 1996), 125-135. Rabbi Moshe David Tendler was Rabbi Feinstein’s son-in-law. See J. David Bleich, Tradition, Fall 1996, pages 92-125.

[4] BT Sanhedrin 74a.

[5] The Scriptural source for this law comes from the time when King David ordered Joab to bring Sheba ben Bichri to justice (2 Samuel 20ff).

[6] One could argue that Rashi, who permits turning over the selected individual to the aggressor, would allow the surgeons to perform the surgery. Although “Baby A” will certainly die in surgery, it is as though “Baby A”  has been “selected” to die, and she may be killed in order to save “Baby B’s” life. However, Maimonides, who on principle opposes killing one to save many, would oppose this operation. Rabbi Tendler reports that Rabbi Feinstein refused to rely on Rashi’s opinion, because he did not want to rely on a disputed opinion in a life and death case.

[7] A personal caveat: I once had a conversation with the late Chief Rabbi of the British Commonwealth, Rabbi Immanual Jacobowitz back in 1985 at a Jewish Medical ethics convention in San Francisco, who felt that “Baby A” should never have been sacrificed for “Baby B” and concurred with Rabbi Ben Tsion Uziel’s logic, but Rabbi Jacobowitz’s reading of R. Uziel may not be correct for the reasons we will suggest later on.

Another friend writes from New York, “The concern I will share today is most definitely not a new one, but it is an issue that comes up every year, and we have yet to find an answer to this dilemma. Why in the world is Pesach food so expensive? The prices of Pesach food products are outrageous. These kosher-for-Passover items, from ketchup, to mayonnaise, to cakes, candies and dairy products are all so much more expensive than these foodstuffs are during the year. Is there any good reason that a box of a handful of chocolate leaves costs the kosher consumer over 7 dollars? Is there a good reason why a bottle of kosher l’Pesach ketchup cost over a dollar more than it does during the year? Why do I have to pay close to ten dollars for a box of sorry tasting kosher l’Pesach sponge cake? Why do we continue to allow food companies to fleece us – yes, fleece us – every year Pesach time?”

Oh, I could add to the stories from the Chicago area. A small package of cream cheese costs $6, a three pound kosher brisket 20% more, Houston, I think we have a problem here. Kosher slaughter houses are kosher for Passover all year round; they are not four star restaurants one could order a prime rib at. When the kosher companies like Streits, Manishegetz, and others charge such exorbitant sums, one must wonder for when kashrut businesses steal from the public, ask yourself an important but obvious question: Why should I rely upon their hechser (Kosher approval), if they are so darn unethical? Dear friends, the Kosher Emperor has no clothes. Another good friend of mine in New York told me that her family once spent $15,000 a week at a Passover certified hotel–where the food was rotten! I went to a once formerly 5 star restaurant where the food was fit for a Doggie Diner.

Frankly, I think Jews should boycott all the companies that sell kosher and use some common sense instead and try to observe Passover the best way they know how. Heresy? Not really. We offer contrarian wisdom here, but I believe if Ashkenazi Jews could get over their halachic hangup with rice and beans, they could probably teach a most valuable lesson to the rabbinic supervisors and their companies that they would never forget.

A year ago in the heart of Harediville, New York, an edict signed by 30 prominent rabbis, declared, “One must be extra careful in circumstances where a monetary loss will be incurred. . . . Now before Passover, especially when the economy is so bad, we are reminding people of the Jewish law concerning monopolies . . .  particularly at Passover when there is so much need.” Yet, this year, we hear nothing at all. Once again the rabbis are asleep at the wheel.

When I read about the endless tales in the news about rabbinic corruption in the American Kashrut industry, I wonder whether these culprits realize they are reinforcing every negative caricature about Jews in the proverbial anti-Semitic book. Don’t they care?

This kind of price gouging truly undermines the holiday of Pesach–by virtue of impoverishing those who care to seriously observe it. How can anyone look forward to this holiday knowing they are about to get ripped off? “Tradition!” you say? What a pity. We must do better.

For the greater part of early rabbinic history, rice and legumes used to be considered staple foods for Passover, but when did the change occur? More importantly, why did so many Ashkenazi communities give up on eating rice and legumes? Granted, this may not be the most interesting topic. True, many people could care less about the pedantic discussions regarding the Passover status of rice and legumes.

Nevertheless, the history of this old rabbinic controversy reveals something interesting about the psychology of the forbidding mind that continues to shape the attitudes of many observant Jews who are unaware of this custom’s history and controversy. From a psychoanalytical perspective, the human compulsion to forbid the permitted is what really fascinates me. Understanding the evolution of a community’s mindset can be as exciting as reading a good Sherlock Holmes mystery.

The Talmud mentions how Rav Pappi once gave permission to the Resh Galuta’s bakers to thicken a pot with flour made from hasissi (“oven-dried grain”—Rashi). Tosfot  considers Rashi’s insight to be a no-brainer and suggests that hasissi refers to lentil flour; ordinarily, this kind of flour does not become chametz—leavened. [1]. But even this interpretation is unclear. Why was lentil flour forbidden? Tosfot does not really offer a logical explanation. Could the appearance of anything that rises–even if it derives from vegetable flour be the reason for the custom to avoid  eating legumes during Passover?

One of the subsequent Tosfot scholars named Rabbi Yitschak of Corbeil (13th century) offers an explanation in his SeMaK (Sefer Mitzvot Katan). He claims that the prohibition was by no means a “new custom,” but had already existed for many generations. The rabbis of early medieval times feared that the grains of rice or legumes might get commingled with wheat, millet, barley, rye, and spelt. “Supposedly,” argued R. Yitzchak, “people used to place their grains in any sack container that was available for storage.” Perhaps the lentil flower became commingled with a bit of wheat flour. A person might easily think he was eating lentil bread, not realizing that some of the forbidden grains might also be a part of the bread. [2]

R. Yosef Caro (author of the Code of Jewish Law) writes in his Beit Yosef commentary to the Tur, that some scholars felt that the average person might not be able to distinguish between the unripened kernels of grain and legumes since they resemble one another.[3] In practice, R. Yosef Caro (in his Beit Yosef) disregards this fear, whereas the Ashkenazi Jews follow the more stringent view and abstain from eating rice and legumes during Passover. Once canonized as “tradition,” people tend to think this is the way it has always been, but it ain’t so! Early Ashkenazi rabbis objected to this stringency for many reasons.

Some rabbinic scholars considered the special Passover proscription as a “mistaken custom,” while R. Yerucham brusquely called  it a “foolish  custom.”  One might wonder, “Why perpetuate a custom that is logically absurd?” Evidently, the champions of common sense ran into a proverbial brick wall. We may derive solace knowing that not all the medieval Ashkenazi rabbis blindly followed this custom. The real reason why beans became forbidden was because beans were the standard food of mourners, and mourning is forbidden during the holidays! The medieval rabbis had forgotten this simple truth, hence the confusion.

There are other reasons why rice and legumes ought to be used for Passover:

• There are not a lot of Passover foods to choose from.

• Rabbinic certification traditionally charges exorbitant prices for their “kosher” supervision. Once again, the public gets taken advantage by the shepherds who are supposed to be concerned with their welfare (cf. Eze. 34ff).

• Halachic stringency sometimes creates a “Holier-than-Thou” type of mentality that trivializes the holiday’s spiritual importance.
• Food affects mood. Eating rice and legumes are healthier for a more balanced diet, and are also arguably preferable to the heavy animal proteins people imbibe during the holiday. A healthier diet makes one feel lighter and less weighed down–perfect metaphors for the spiritual lightness we ought to feel during this special time of the year. Complex carbohydrates are good for mind and energizing for the body!

In the end, religious compulsiveness and neurotic anxieties triumphed over rabbinic common sense; and we have seen this kind of  obsessive compulsive thinking exponentially get worst over the centuries. Caught in a recurring time loop, the will of the naysayers continues to dominate the more flexidox religious communities, who would gladly eat legumes and rice if only their rabbis would prefer to adopt a “live and let live” kind of Halachic attitude.

The spirit of Passover celebrates freedom and not asceticism. Clearly, the Sages in their wisdom delineated enough prohibitions for the holiday. Must we add an endless list of more dietary taboos that nobody since the 13th century never heard of? Rabbinic wisdom teaches, “If the Nazirite, who only denied himself the single pleasure of drinking wine, is considered a sinner, how much more is this true about a person who denies himself pleasure in general and chooses to live a life of asceticism?” (BT Nazir 19a). Passover is a holiday to celebrate freedom; it is not a holiday to enslave ourselves to unnecessary restrictions that diminish the joy of the holiday.

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Notes:

[1] BT Pesachim 40b. Note that it never occurs to Tosfot that maybe the Talmud might have have written this anecdote out of chronological order–at a time when maybe it wasn’t so obvious.

[2] Cf. Mordechai’s gloss on BT Pesachim Chapter 2, 588, who cites the SeMak. This was also the view of the Tur (O.H. 453).

[3] O.H. 453:1

One of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s most brilliant philosophical concepts is what he terms as the  Sprachspiel, better known  in English as the “language-game.” Linguistic expression is analogous to the rules of a game,Wittgenstein explains:

“Let us imagine a language. . . .The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building-stones; there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words ‘block’, ‘pillar’, ‘slab’, ‘beam’. A calls them out; –B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. — Conceive of this as a complete primitive language.”[1]

For me, my favorite game is chess. If I point out to my opponent, “Please move your king, it is in check,” the word “king,” or “check” has a specific meaning and relevance to someone who already knows the game. Neither word would make any contextual sense to someone who is unfamiliar with the game’s rules. By the same token, a child will not understand what the word “kitty” means until he or she first experiences seeing or touching a cat. According to Wittgenstein,  One cannot define what a word is, but only how it functions.

Down the “Rabbi” Hole

Rabbinic language–both ancient and modern–also follows a similar kind of formula; how the rabbi interprets or defines a situation, creates a behavioral trajectory leading to certain results.

One of the most significant examples of how this process occurs is with the estranged wife who cannot remarry because her husband refuses to grant her a religious divorce. To say that a woman is an “agunah,” means she is in a social sense barred from resuming a normal life until her marital  status is resolved. From the 2nd century onward, the Sages went out of their way to liberate a “chained” woman like this through just about any kind of legal means possible. This has generally been the policy of most medieval rabbis up to the modern era.

In my early twenties, after receiving ordination at age 22, I decided I wanted to become a  rabbinic judge; one of the areas  I was thoroughly tested in was  Chapter 17 of Eben HaEzer that dealt with this topic. Many of the responsa on this topic read like an interesting mystery novel. A reader could not help but discover that the earlier generations of rabbis were problem solvers–not problem makers like we have today.

Since the death of Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, the Haredi community has become more radicalized because of their hatred and fear of  modernity in general and especially egalitarianism. The agunah’s plight is reminiscent of the famous conversation Alice has with the clever Cheshire Cat:

‘In that direction, the Cat said, waving its right paw around, ‘lives a Hatter: and in that direction’, waving the other paw, ‘lives a March Hare. Visit either you like “ they’re both mad.
`But I don’t want to go among mad people,’ Alice remarked.
`Oh, you can’t help that,’ said the Cat: `we’re all mad here. I’m mad. You’re mad.’
`How do you know I’m mad?’ said Alice.
`You must be,’ said the Cat, `or you wouldn’t have come here.’

Like Alice, the agunah is stuck in an artificial constructed rabbinic reality where the rules of logic and ethics no longer make any coherent sense. This is especially the case in Israel where the Orthodox women in particular find themselves caught in a maze of rabbinic corruption and red tape. Once a woman enters the rabbit hole of the Haredi rabbinate (Sorry, I could not resist the pun!), she is faced with menacing threats from all sides.  Alice in Wonderland is an apt metaphor for the kind of disorientation the agunah experiences in her attempt to extricate herself from her ex-husband and especially the rabbis!

Statistical Sleight of Hand

If an estranged woman could “officially” be denied her status as an agunah, would that mean that the problem does not really exist? It sounds like the Cheshire Cat has been traveling to Me’ah She’arim lately. To the victim, it is like a world gone insane.

In one of Rivkah Lubitch’s newest columns on Ynet News, she discusses this kind of precise case. While examining the data that was recently published by the Rabbinic Court Administration, one would unmistakeably get the impression that in the year 2007, there were only 180 women classified as “agunot,” women who cannot remarry for the reasons mentioned above. However, this number does not jive with the figures produced by the Rabbinic Court Special Task Force, which lists the number as around 292 cases!

Like a good detective, Ms. Lubitch discovers that many cases involving the rabbinic courts involve divorce proceedings often have to begin from square one again since  a member (s) of the original court of rabbis who first heard a case, were subsequently replaced by rabbis who hadn’t heard the case–thus creating a bottleneck in the divorce proceedings. She explains how one case eventually got settled:

“From the court’s perspective: All’s well that ends well. In 2009 the rabbinic court detectives caught the husband, brought him to court, and he agreed to divorce. A success story, no? Not in my mind. A divorce given 10 years after the woman first filed for divorce, seven years after the parties signed a divorce agreement, and five years after written summaries were filed with the rabbinic court can not be considered a success. With all this, the court managed to make itself hated in the eyes of the woman, her children, and all her acquaintances. The court refused to take any action, showing no empathy for the pain of a woman who lived unhappily, miserably and possibly in sin. Moreover, I doubt if L was ever counted as an agunah in the ’scientific’ survey conducted in 2007. How could she counted? After all, in 2007, her case was closed!”[2]

Denial Is Not a River in Egypt

As I mentioned earlier, the rabbis are master contortionists, and their halachic edicts in Israel create a dangerous game that keeps the woman in a state of limbo until the rabbis decide to finally take the measures to effectively end the divorce–but never without scarring the lives of the poor agunot. The Israeli Supreme Court needs to strip the Haredi rabbis of their power over all issues pertaining to personal status. The monopoly of Haredi power must be broken.  As bad as the recalcitrant husband happens to be, the rabbinic system is incomparably worst because it routinely marginalizes and humiliates its society’s female members in the name of Halacha. Is it any small wonder why the Haredi rabbis are so deeply despised in Israel?

These rabbis will someday have to face the Supreme Judge in the world of Truth–before Whom, there is no escape.

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Notes:

[1] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, c. 2.

[2] Rivkah Lubitch,The Jewish World, “Who’s counting agunot?” (3/16/2010) — http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3861525,00.html