Rabbi Michael Leo Samuel

The identity of Nimrod continues to be an enigma. Five different approaches have been pursued.  The first identifies Nimrod as a god, usually the Mesopotamian god of hunting and war Ninurta or Marduk; both these names are phonetically similar to the Nimrod’s name. Jewish tradition connects Nimrod’s name נִמְרֹד (literally “we shall revolt”) with the verb מָרַד (m¹rad = “to rebel” or “revolt”). The rabbis regarded Nimrod as the mastermind of the Tower of Babel. Under Nimrod’s rule (v. 10), all the various Mesopotamian city-states became consolidated. Other speculations include:

Nimrod was Gilgamesh, the legendary leader who ruled the S. Mesopotamian city of Uruk around 2600 B.C.E. and was thus a contemporary of Agga, the ruler of Kish.  Gilgamesh was believed to be two-thirds god and one-third human. According to some of the Sumerian legends about Gilgamesh, he was a Semitic, who lived during the Second Early Dynastic period who fortified Uruk (biblical Erech, modern Warka) and went on to defeat King Agga of Kish (cf. ANET, pp. 44–52).

Gilgamesh is also mentioned in the Sumerian list of kings as reigning after the flood and parallels Nimrod as the first king to rule after the Flood.  In terms of Assyrian mythology, Gilgamesh was regarded as a demigod who imposed his will upon his subjects, reducing them to forced labor, causing them to suffer under his tyranny. Like Nimrod of later rabbinic tradition, Gilgamesh was said to be a mighty builder. Gilgamesh’s subjects prayed that the gods would send him a rival who would curb Gilgamesh’s harsh rule. Among his exploits, Gilgamesh would fight against monsters and wild beasts alike.

In the third approach Nimrod has been equated with an historical personage, possibly Tukulti-Ninurta I, an Assyrian king who reigned c. 1238-c. 1197 B.C.E. Tukulti-Ninurta I established  Assyrian supremacy over King Kashtiliash IV, ruler of the Kassites to the southeast  of his country (about the Persian Gulf), and subjugated ancient Armenia to the northeast. For a short time, Tukulti-Ninurta became the first Assyrian king to rule over Babylon. Among his accomplishments, Tukulti-Ninurta I erected a noted ziggurat temple to the goddess Ishtar-Dinitu (“Ishtar of the Dawn”) that served as a model for Assyrian architecture.[1]

Wiseman has suggested a possible fourth approach, namely, that Nimrod resembles Sargon I of Akkad (reigned c. 2334-2279 B.C.E.), who was one of the earliest of the world’s great empire builders. The extension of Nimrod’s kingdom from southern Mesopotamia (Gen.10:10) to northern Mesopotamia (Gen. 10:11) parallels the growth of the first known empire in history, the dynasty of Akkad.

According to the Sumerian king list, the first five rulers of Akkad (Sargon, Rimush, Manishtusu, Naram-Sin, and Shar-kali-sharric. 2305-2000  B.C.E.) ruled for a total of 142 years;  Sargon and Naram-Sin (about 2300  B.C.E.), were among the greatest of the heroic kings of old.  Sargon I conquered all of southern Mesopotamia as well as parts of Syria, Anatolia, and Elam (Western Iran) The Sumerian king list has Sargon I reigning for 56 years. He established the region’s first Semitic dynasty and was considered the founder of the Mesopotamian military tradition. Although his throne name was Sargon I, he may have had other names.[2]

Lastly, Nimrod may be related to the Akkadian word for the Amorite kingdom, Amurru. Cassuto thinks that Nimrod may have been an Amorite conqueror who conquered the city of Asshur, the capital of the Assyrian kingdom c. 19^th century B.C.E.   The Ammaru were also believed to have been partly responsible for causing of the downfall of the 3rd dynasty of Ur and Akkad at the beginning of the second millennium (c. 2112 — 2004 B.C.E.).  The Amorites are believed to have originated from the great tribal federations of Arabia who immigrated en masse to Babylon, as well as to the mid-Euphrates region, and Syria-Palestine.

Whether Nimrod was indeed the same person as Gilgamesh, Sargon I or Tukulti-Ninurta I, is subject to conjecture, but one thing for certain — Nimrod became the  true archetype of  Assyrian monarchs who followed and belongs to the sphere of Babylonian mythology.[3]

It might seem odd that Nimrod, a son of Cush, a Hamite would establish the region’s first Semitic dynasty, but one must remember that there was considerable intermingling in the families of Shem and Ham and all the peoples of Mesopotamia as seen in the languages and in the architecture. If the Table of Nations was written 7^th- 10^th centuries B.C.E., then the biblical writers probably had in mind the mighty Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian emperors who ruled the world with an iron fist. That explanation seems like the most plausible. Continue Reading

Over a year has passed since the terrible Arizona shooting, when a gunman opened fire, killing six people and wounding 13 others.  Gabrielle Giffords, a conservative Democrat representing Arizona’s Eighth District, was among those wounded. She remained in critical condition after she survived a single gunshot to the head fired at point-blank range. Within three days after the shooting, one of her doctors described her chances of survival as “101 percent.” Her neurosurgeon, Dr. Dong Kim, called her progress “almost miraculous.”

We are all blessed with her recovery, but  greater challenges lie ahead for Gabrielle and ourselves as a nation, which sometimes teeters on the edge of insanity.

We wonder: Have we learned anything new from this devastating experience?

One bill that appeared before Congress proposed that the House of Representatives “reduce” the time allowed for criminal background checks. The Senate asked for a three-business day waiting period. The amended Bill in the House proposed a 24 hour waiting period. The reason: gun shows are very popular during the weekends. They argue that there would be no time to conduct a background check on people wishing to purchase arms.

Oh really?!

I think our politicians are living in Chelm, a place in Jewish history reserved for fools who think they are wise. If somebody wishes to purchase firearms at a convention, why don’t the new purchasers take the test one week before the gun show? What is wrong with this picture?

Over the last decade and a half, more and more states are starting to require psychological testing as a condition of hiring any full time police officer. Given the immense stress of the job, this decision makes perfect sense. In fact, schools across the country now require psychological testing for its faculty members. Even Wal-Mart requires psychological testing for its workers—perhaps because they sell firearms at their stores.

Now, it seems to me that the recent Arizona shooting might have been avoided had the state required psychological testing for anyone wishing to own a gun. In fact, if every state required psychological testing, we might be able to cut down the number of accidental shootings, or even willful shootings that seem to occur every year in our great nation.

One cannot expect a family to recognize or, for that matter, even be willing to admit that their son may have deep-rooted psychological problems requiring professional help. In addition, I think the question of machine guns, semi-automatic weapons, assault-rifles, and similar type weapons should be banned except for the military or police. Private individuals do not need to act like Rambo when a vagrant is breaking into their home. [1]

In Judaism, safety is a religious concern. The Bible requires that a roof be properly gated, in order to prevent people from falling off of it (Deut. 22:8). One precept in particular is especially important, “You shall not curse the deaf; you shall not put a stumbling block before the blind, but you will fear your God; I am YHWH ” (Lev. 19:14).

This verse includes two types of prohibitions: (1) placing a stumbling block in front of the blind for sport or entertainment, (2) taking advantage of someone’s ignorance–especially for pecuniary gain. The verse stresses that a God fearing person will not take advantage of anyone for any reason.

By the expression, “God fearing,” this is the biblical way of describing a moral person who acts with a reverence toward life. God-fearing also indicates that Creator and Judge of the world will hold all such offenders accountable for disrespecting human life. Authentic piety is best reflected by acts of compassion and consideration–especially toward individuals who suffer from a serious disability–whether physical, emotional, intellectual, and psychological. [2]

It is also instructive that Maimonides asserts that enabling someone to commit a crime, (e.g., the individual who offers a bribe, or offers to pay interest on a loan) violates the above biblical dictum.[3]

In light of the Arizona shooting—or for that matter, any other well-known shootings that we have seen in recent history, the Columbine or Virginia Tech incidents—the onus of responsibility cannot be placed on someone who is mentally-impaired or schizophrenic, or someone suffering from psychotic-break with reality.

It is not realistic to expect psychotics like Jared Lee Loughner to behave like normal citizens. I expect the judge will send him to a special hospital for the criminally insane. Local courts and governments have a duty to make it as difficult as possible in determining who can and ought to own a gun. Certain individuals should never own a gun of any kind. The duty to protect citizens is the government’s responsibility.

I would argue that we apply the same standards that exist for other professionals in our country also be applied to anyone wishing to own a gun. The time has come for the gun-lobby to start leading the campaign to protect the country from individuals who endanger public welfare. Ultimately, such a responsible move will not diminish the constitutional rights of owning a gun–but such sensible legislation will enable all of us to breathe easier

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• History of Honor Killings and Mutilations

None of us are products of the present. The values of past generations, along with their history, continue to shape and structure the contemporary psyche of people everywhere in the world.

In this brief article, I wish to provide a sketch about the history of honor killings. In Carol Delancy’s amazing book, “Abraham on Trial,” the author examines the story of the Akedah–the “Binding of Isaac,” which she claims, really extols the virtues of patriarchal power. Delancy argues that in Middle Eastern societies–ancient and modern–the sacrifice of children more than the protection of children, has become the focus of their faith. Her underlying premise has important implications for how we might understand this dangerous phenomena that continues to haunt the 21st century.

The history of honor killings can be found in the annals of antiquity. According to ancient Roman law, if a woman had been raped by a rebellious slave, her reputation was for all practical purposes destroyed The Romans considered the honor killing as a “merciful act.” If a husband caught his wife in an adulterous relationship, the wife’s fate was subject to the whim of her husband.

The first king of Rome, Romulus, is said to have allowed the death penalty for women who committed adultery or drank wine.  Roman law also permitted the father to execute his children if they were guilty of adultery based on the Julian law regarding adultery (Lex Iulia de adulteriis) that was passed in around 18 CE during the reign of Augustus. [2] Emperor Nero divorced his wife Octavia in 62 CE, alleging that she had committed adultery; however, the evidence was scanty. Nevertheless, the court banished Octavia to Pandateria. Nero ordered his soldiers to slowly execute her, and within a few days, they brought back her head to Nero.[1] The Emperor soon married Poppaea, who incidentally is believed to have later converted to Judaism! Seneca and other playwrights often lampooned Nero’s disposal of his ex-wife. Just imagine what the Romans would have done, had they invented television!

The Greek historian and Roman citizen Plutarch (c. 46 – 120 C.E.) quotes a well known aphorism from the Athenian statesman Solon 638 B.C.E.– 558 B.C.E.), “We keep mistresses for our pleasures, concubines for constant attendance, and wives to bear us legitimate children and to be our faithful housekeepers. . . .” He adds, “Yet, because of the wrong done to the husband only, the Athenian lawgiver Solon allowed any man to kill an adulterer whom he had taken in the act.”

Mutilation of female adulterers occurred in Babylon, China, Egypt, as well as among Native American Indian cultures. The list goes on–wherever men “own” their wives, this type of abuse has occurred. In Muslim countries, it is still a common occurrence. [3]

The common feature in almost all honor killings is the idea that the Other is the property of the aggrieved spouse.  It is startling that women are not considered persons; they are considered chattel and are perceived as bereft of an identity independent of the husband.

The Bible itself contains numerous stories dealing with honor killings that illustrate our last point. For example, Dinah’s massacre of the Shechemites in Genesis 34 meets all the criteria regarding an honor killing, but in this instance the brothers take their rage out on Dinah’s lover, Shechem and his immediate community. Tamar is nearly burned at the stake by her self-righteous father-in-law, Judah, for having shamed the family. Tamar knew Judah was an ethically challenged individual.  Were it not for Tamar’s anticipation of this possible outcome, she would have been killed (Gen. 38:24).

One of the most important pieces of biblical legislation pertains to the wife who is accused of adultery (Num. 5:11-31). An elaborate trial takes place that ultimately prevents her murder. Despite the primitive background of the precept, the ritual of the Sotah  probably saved many female lives.

Perhaps even more disturbing is the abundance of Scriptural imagery where God goes after Israel for having worshiped idols. In exacting retribution, God strips Israel naked, and subjects her to all kinds of, presumably, sexual abuse at the hand of her lovers (Ezek. 16:37-40).

God also resorts to mutilation, for in Ezekiel 23, God says in v. 25, “I will leave it to them to judge, and they will judge you by their own ordinances. I will let loose my jealousy against you, so that they shall deal with you in fury, cutting off your nose and ears; and what is left of you shall fall by the sword. They shall take away your sons and daughters, and what is left of you shall be devoured by fire” (Ezek. 23:25).

Mark Twain once said, “I have no problem with those parts of the Bible I don’t understand. It’s those parts of the Bible I do understand that gives me fits.

Amen!

When you look at the mutilation that has taken place in Arab countries, the imagery of husbands abusing their wives, or other female family members is sickening.[7] In both psychological and theological terms, abusive imagery of God often functions as the template for how males interact with females.

The Bible sometimes becomes a template for the idolization of masculine power. Men assume the role of “God,” who possesses the power of life and death over a hapless victim. Is maleness the closest thing to Godliness? I don’t think so. Women can create life from their bodies, just like God creates life out of Her body (so to speak!).

While none of us can change the past, we can change the present and create a new and hopeful future for oppressed women wherever they may be. As of late, we have been receiving a lot of hits on this website from Egypt. For all those wishing to promote democracy in Egypt, there can be no true democratic reforms anywhere without  ensuring equal rights for women. Do not let the Sha’ria Law take away your freedom and dreams for a healthy Egypt. In Israel, we have a similar problem with the Ultra-Orthodox. Standing together with one powerful voice will make the status quo think twice about their ambitions to control the thoughts and soul of  a people.

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Notes:

[1] Richard Bauman, Crime and Punishment in Ancient Rome (NY: Routledge, 1996), 89-90.

[2] Rebecca Langlands, Sexual Morality in Ancient Rome (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 20.

[3] http://atlasshrugs2000.typepad.com/atlas_shrugs/2009/03/honor-killing-islams-gruesome-gallery.html

Kingston, Ontario was once a quiet peaceful community. That all changed when Mohammad Shafia, his wife, and son decided to murder the girls of their family. When he discovered his daughters sending pictures of themselves posing in bras and panties to their boyfriends, he said, “They betrayed humankind. They betrayed Islam. They betrayed our religion; they betrayed everything! I say to myself, ‘You did well.’ Were they to come to life, I would do it again. May the devil s— on their graves!”[1]

This case shocked and captivated the Canadian nation. This past Sunday, the court arrived at a verdict: Mohammad Shafia, his wife Tooba Mohammad Yahya and their son Hamed Mohammad Shafia had each been found guilty of four counts of first-degree murder. Justice Robert Maranger put it best when he said, “It’s difficult to conceive of a more heinous, more despicable, more honor-less crime.”

If this story interests you, read on.

The tragic murder of three female family members in Canada is a grim reminder that honor killings are still a problem even in the 21st century. Male family members may attack a female family member for a variety of reasons, e.g., for refusing to enter into an arranged marriage, for having been raped or sexually assaulted, for allegedly wanting to leave an abusive husband.

Although the Mohammad Shafia trial has attracted considerable attention in the Western press, in the Arab world, honor killings are routine and considered normal behavior—even in the 21st century. Honor killings exist in many Muslim countries with the tacit approval of local law enforcement agencies and clerics. Muslim women live with a deep-seated fear of their male family members. To most of us living in the West, this is a foreign concept most of us cannot understand.

Among the Palestinians, the Palestinian Authority, exempt men from facing any punishment if a male family member kills a female family member for “dishonoring” the family. Despite Abbas’s promise to eliminate this exemption, he has not undertaken any action.[2] Like American politicians, Abbas is skilled in the art of double-speak: say one thing to pander to the rabble, but do the exact opposite!

According to the UNICEF, about two-thirds of all the murders in the Palestinian territories are due to honor killings.[3] Men feel killing these “shameless” women removes the shame of adultery from the family.[4] The majority of the honor killings occur in rural villages, where the majority of its inhabitants are uneducated and live in squalor. Prior to Israel’s departure from Gaza, the Israelis kept records of the honor killings, which came to the attention of the Israeli police.

A number of brave Muslim women are speaking against this barbaric practice, such as Riffat Hassan, an activist who founded the International Network for the Rights of Female Victims of Violence in Pakistan. An Islamic theologian, she effectively speaks for women’s rights, especially regarding honor killings. Hassan courageously appeared on the ABC news program Nightline in February 1999 to address this “misogynistic” practice.[5] Although this extreme application of shari’a is not common in every Islamic country, it does occur. In countries like Iran, women who suffer rape are executed for bringing disgrace upon their families.

Like the Halachic concept of tsniyut (modesty laws), Shari’a law prescribes a dress-code for women they must adhere to. The hijab varies from one Muslim culture to another. Under the Taliban, CNN filmed a special documentary called, “Inside Afghanistan: Behind the Veil.” The film depicts an undercover female reporter who secretly documents the daily life of the Afghani women under the oppressive Taliban. While she covered her face a thick veil, she found life to be almost impossible. If she accidentally revealed her face or ankles, she could have been arrested.[6]

Even more conservative Muslim regimes like Iran and the Persian Gulf states have similar public dress codes that a woman must adhere to or face corporeal punishment. A woman who fails to conform to the local standard of hijab is likely to be punished severely. Worse, she brings disgrace on her family in the eyes of her community in a culture where honor is closely bound up with the virtues of modesty and purity. The standards extend from dictates about wearing the hijab to laws regulating behavior toward men. Often a woman is forbidden even to look at a man other than her husband or an immediate family member. Remember one rule: In the Middle East, people kill over honor. This is a tradition that stretches back to the earliest periods of recorded history.

Whether it be in the Mullacracy of Iran, or the Sheikdoms of the Middle East, or for that matter—in the streets of Jerusalem and Beth Shemesh. Women are dehumanized and reduced to sex objects by the men of their society. If you ever wanted to understand what Radical Islam and Ultra-Orthodoxy have in common, it is a mutual misogyny of women. No woman can define her identity apart from her husband, family, or community.

The war between Radical Islam and the West is fighting for control of our soul and our freedom. Radical Islam is not interested in peaceful coexistence. As Jews, we are also experiencing a similar problem in Israel, whenever we see Haredim attack women they perceive as, “immodestly dressed.” The Ultra-Orthodox wish to transform Israel into a theocracy. Although there is little we can practically do to change the overall situation, change is incremental. Supporting women’s groups that protect the rights of women, whether they be Muslim women’s groups or Jewish women’s groups—adding our voice to theirs may eventually produce the changes millions of women yearn to see in that troublesome part of the world.

Remember: One person can change the world. However, the power of two or more, can effect an even greater change! Continue Reading

After reading Neil N. Winkler’s new book, “Bringing the Prophets to Life: A Timely Look at a Timeless Story” (Jerusalem: Gefen, 2011), I felt elated. Somebody in the Orthodox world has finally written a book on the Prophets! The study of the Tanakh remains one of the most neglected areas of Jewish study in the yeshiva world today. The study of the Babylonian Talmud remains as popular as ever. The 12^th century French Talmudist (and grandson of Rashi), Rabbanu Tam writes, “Nowadays, the study of the Babylonian Talmud has become the dominant focus of study. The early generations of scholars dedicated a third of their time studying the Scriptures.”[1]

Today, Artscroll, Judaica Press, Moznaim have translated a number of fine Orthodox works on the Tanakh, but tend these commentaries have a distinct medieval style that is unsuited for the 21st century. Winkler’s “Bringing the Prophets to Life: A Timely Look at a Timeless Story,” breaks away from these rather dull translations and expositions; he introduces a more conceptual approach to engaging and cross-examining the biblical texts most yeshiva students seldom ever study.

In the interest of brevity, I will focus on his treatment of King David and his affair with Bathsheba.  For me, this particular biblical story deals with the humanity of David that is fascinating. The author discusses the Talmudic view, expressed by Rabbi Judah HaNasi, “Anyone who says King David ‘sinned,’ is simply mistaken” (BT Shabbat 56a). Admittedly, Winkler agrees that the Talmudic perspective is counterintuitive. After all, David does sleep with a married woman; he orders his general to leave Uriah, Bathsheba’s husband, exposed and unprotected in the midst of a raging battle. Talmudic interpretation argues that Uriah provided his wife with a religious divorce (a.k.a., a “get”) prior to his departure to the battlefield. Ergo, Bathsheba wasn’t really, “married,” but happened to be “halachically” divorced. (It’s a good thing King David didn’t have the Israeli Rabbinate advising him!!)

Winkler wonders: “With this clear declaration, our rabbis set forth a challenge to all traditional biblical scholars and students: How can we understand the story of David and Bat-Sheva as found and implied in the text in light of the Talmud’s declaration? Did David not sin at all despite ample references to his sin in the text? What were the rabbinical giants of the past conveying to the future generations?” (p. 108). After explaining the obvious and more straight forward meaning of the text, Winkler admits, “This is certainly not the David who is so God-sensitive  and moral, the David who is so close to his men and his nation, the David we have gotten to know in the course of the twenty chapters . . .

Ok, we get it. David’s behavior doesn’t exactly strike one as “kosher.”

Winkler considers a number of possible expositions to the exegetical problem he poses. One approach suggests that the Talmudic statement is more of a “midrashic” homily, not to be taken literally. According to this reading, David’s behavior is simply, “beyond our ability to understand.” Maybe this is the kind of answer might satisfy the gullible yeshiva students, but it doesn’t satisfy people who live in the real world. Fortunately, Winkler rejects this tasteless approach. Besides, everybody knows King David had a passion for pretty ladies.  David almost committed adultery wth Abagail, but fortunately for him–her husband died! David immediately proposes to Abagail, immediately after Nabal’s death! (cf. 1 Samuel 25:40-42.)

Surprisingly, Winkler argues that David did not actually commit adultery, for if he did—he would have been worthy of the death penalty. However, he is guilty of a “moral trespass.” By the standard of Gentile kings, David does nothing “wrong,” but God expects a higher standard from His anointed.

Sorry Rabbi, that statement doesn’t wash. Archaeological background might have helped Winkler on his last point. Adultery was not considered an acceptable form of behavior of any Semitic king in the ancient world! In Genesis 20:9, the Philistine King Abimelech refers to adultery as חֲטָאָה גְדֹלָה  “the great sin.” When Joseph tried to persuade Madaam Potifar to stay away, he tells her that adultery  is הָרָעָה הַגְּדֹלָה “great evil.” It is obvious that adultery is a sin–even by the standard of Gentile Kings!!

Ancient Israel’s disdain for adultery is consistent with the social attitudes  found among Israel’s neighbors.  For example: unearthed texts from Ugarit [2] and Egypt refer to adultery as a, “great crime.”[3]  The ancients regarded adultery not as a crime against a life-partner, but as a sin against the gods.  The protection of the integrity of the family unit was important because the family is the foundation of society. I will admit, Winkler’s comments probably describe the outrageous behavior of Roman emperors a lot better, but the Semitic kings of the ancient Near East had much higher ethical standards.

Winkler’s proofs are interesting—but certainly debatable! (1)  The prophet Nathan never criticizes David for having committed adultery. Rather, he criticizes David for arranging Uriah’s death.  (2)  When David confesses his sin, he carefully says, “I have sinned to God,” i.e., he did not commit a sin against Bat Sheva. As further proof, Winkler cites the verse, “Against you, you alone, have I sinned, and done what is evil in your sight . . .” Finally, Winkler cites a third biblical passage where the biblical narrator briefly alludes to “the matter of Uriah the Hittite” (1 Kgs. 15:5) and never makes mention of this incident again.

Oy, Rabbi Winkler has studied way too much pilpul (hair-splitting  Talmudic sophistry). Why must we defend every outlandish rabbinic statement? Since when are the Talmudic Sages infallible beings? Some of the rabbis thought Rebekah was 3 years old when she first met Isaac, or that the giant Og, hitched a ride on Noah’s ark. Some comments are just plain silly and are not oracles from Sinai.

Abarbanel’s commentary (ca. 15th century), offers a stinging criticism of King David—and represents a view that Winkler ignored.

• Rabbi Judah HaNasi’s words are nothing more than a Midrashic homily, hardly requiring a response. I can easily excuse Rabbi Judah’s words, for he was a descendant from David [4], and was not really truthfully speaking . . .  The Scriptures reveals all the sordid details of his illicit affair for all to see, and if David did not “sin,” how could he say, “I have sinned to the LORD”? Why did he go out of his way to repent in the most appropriate manner, as the verse attests, “Against you, you alone, have I sinned, and done what is evil in your sight . . .” (Psa. 51:5)? . . . I cannot and will not contradict the Scriptures on this matter! Rebbe’s opinion that “King David’s soldiers all issued a religious divorce to all of his soldiers, in the event they died in war” is simply not warranted by the text, for King David says to Uriah, “You have just come from a journey. Why did you not go down to your house? . . .(2 Sam. 11:10).  . . . I would rather say King David truly sinned, and he truly repented and suffered greatly until he finally obtained atonement.

As a shepherd, David’s job was to take care of God’s flock—and not molest it. This is the entire point of the pastoral parable Nathan the Prophet gently conveyed to King David (2 Samuel 12:1-6). Nathan spoke respectfully to the King, and did not need to catalog each sin David committed in detail because he felt David had some redemptive potential.

Abarbanel’s commentary is important because he demands that we–the reader–be blatantly honest with the text. In addition to Abarbanel’s text, there is an interesting Mishnah that speaks about moral accountability. “If a person sends forth fire in the hands of a deaf-mute, an idiot or a minor he is not liable by the laws of man, but he is liable by the laws of Heaven.” [5] Ordinarily, if a person makes someone a proxy to do something wrong, the person who commits the crime is responsible (this obviously not so with an American court!). It is surprising the Talmudic teachers never thought to include David’s plot to kill Uriah as part of the Talmudic discussion. I suspect the rabbis did not wish to tarnish King David or his descendant, Rabbi Judah HaNasi. If anything, the story of Uriah proves that a man can still be guilty if he sent somebody to commit a heinous crime. Admittedly, my exposition does turn the rabbinic position on top of its head, but what else is a postmodernist (like myself) supposed to do?

In the final analysis, each person is answerable to God for one’s actions. This principle does not apply to someone who is irresponsible, but in the case of a King, the text makes it abundantly clear that the King is morally responsible if he delegates someone to commit mayhem in his name.

King David’s and King Ahab provide an interesting study in contrasts. Ahab covets “Naboth’s vineyard. The evil Jezebel uses a ruse to get Naboth killed for, “cursing the God and the King,” and poor Naboth is executed and his vineyard is confiscated (1 Ki 21:5-16). At first, Ahab’s behavior seems more forgivable, since he did not know about Jezebel’s conspiracy to get rid of Naboth. However, everything changes when he goes along with Naboth’s execution! Elijah condemns Ahab (and Jezebel’s) behavior and boldly says, “You shall say to him, “Thus says the Lord: Have you killed, and also taken possession?” You shall say to him, “Thus says the Lord: In the place where dogs licked up the blood of Naboth, dogs will also lick up your blood” (1 Ki 21:5-16). Naboth never shows any remorse for his behavior, much like Saul.

Winkler makes a fine distinction between King Saul, who denies all responsibility when the prophet confronts him, vis-à-vis King David, who soon acknowledges responsibility, once he is confronted by the evidence and truth—the mark of an honest leader. Throughout the Bible, God always uses weak people to achieve His purpose. David may be powerful on the battlefield, but his home life is a complete mess! I think many American families can easily relate to David’s foibles and humanity.

In contemporary terms, Bill Clinton’s affair with the young White House intern, Monica Lewinsky is a perfect illustration of a leader who denies moral culpability, especially when the whole nation confronts him with the evidence and truth. How can any modern Bible teacher not use such a fantastic illustration? The situation with Newt Gingrich’s infidelity is a bit more complicated, especially because he claims he has repented.

Who knows? Every saint has a past, and every sinner has a future.

Winkler’s book accomplishes his goal quite well. His book creates a dialogue. Intrabiblical texts offer a wonderful way to compare and cross examine well-known biblical narratives, which Winkler does a fine job weaving various passages together in making his points. I am sure the author hopes the conversation he has initiated shall move beyond the ideas he proposes in his book. No author can hope for anything more. In his next book, Rabbi Winkler may want to follow the style Nechama Leibowitz developed in her weekly parsha studies. All and all, Rabbi Winkler’s book held my interest. Continue Reading

The Neturei Karta cannot bear looking at the face of a woman—whether a real woman, or merely the image of a woman’s face, which they find “erotic.”

The philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas observed that the face is the only part of the body that we see in all of its nakedness. Lévinas develops this thought:

• Access to the face is straightaway ethical. . . . There is first the very uprightness of the face, its upright exposure, without defense. The skin of the face is that which stays most naked, most destitute. It is the most naked, though with a decent nudity. It is the most destitute also: there is an essential poverty in the face; the proof of this is that one tries to mask this poverty by putting on poses, by taking on a countenance. The face is exposed, menaced, as if inviting us to an act of violence. At the same time, the face is what forbids us to kill. (Ethics and Infinity 85-86).

The human face is God’s mirror; it is the reflection of our deepest humanity. It is capable of infinite expressions; emotions reveal the essence of our souls. How could we disrespect the one part of our neighbor’s humanity, whose countenance commands without words? The Ultra-Orthodox cannot look at a woman’s face, because to do so they would have to respect her humanity. Unfortunately, they do not see a human being with feelings, hopes and dreams. All they see is a sexual object to tantalize their forbidden thoughts and imagination. Nothing is more dehumanizing.

One prominent Orthodox rabbi, Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, decided to blot out the picture of Ruti Fogel, who was brutally murdered in the West Bank settlement of Itamar, along with her husband and children. Rabbi Aviner’s yeshiva, Machon Meir, publish some of the finest books in Judaic scholarship. It is a halachically progressive school. On the cover of the Machon Meir Newsletter, they blotted out her picture—allegedly, “out of respect.”

What kind of person gets sexually excited when seeing the image of a murder victim? Where is the “respect” in this kind of “halachic” ruling? The Machon Meir Yeshiva has actually dishonored someone who has died a Kiddush HaShem.

Somebody asked me the other day, “What is the Talmudic source for the Haredi ban on the woman’s face?” I thought about it. Actually, there is some antecedent in the Talmud. The Sages wondered, “What constitutes indecent exposure with respect to the She’ma prayer?” The Rabbis grappled with this issue:

R. Isaac said, “Anyone who gazes at one handbreadth of skin belonging to a married woman, constitutes sexual arousal.” Another rabbi said, “Even gazing at a woman’s pinky, constitutes indecent exposure. R. Hisda says, “Even a woman’s exposed leg constitutes indecent exposure.” Samuel said, “Even a woman’s voice constitutes indecent exposure!” (BT Berachoth 24a).

As strange as this Talmudic passage may seem to most of us, remember: the rabbis were concerned solely with a man’s intention, when uttering the She’ma. None of the rabbis prescribed burkas for the women of their community; nor did they tell their followers not to “look” at a woman.

Today’s Ultra-Orthodox acts more out of a sense of hubris; they believe that they are as pious as the rabbis were in the days of yore.

The Hasmonean King Alexander Jannaeus actually offers his Queen Salome some practical advice that one would not expect to hear, “King Jannai said to his wife’, ‘Fear not the Pharisees and the non-Pharisees. Beware of the hypocrites who ape the Pharisees; because their deeds are as immoral as Zimri’s; yet, they expect a reward like Phineas” (BT Shabbat 16b). Continue Reading

Although the Torah does not directly speak about willful destruction of the fetus as a “right,” nevertheless, the sanctity ancient Israel attributed to human life probably made abortion unimaginable.

The reason for this is simple: Infant mortality in biblical times was close to 50% and it is only natural that attitudes about voluntary abortion probably met with horror and disapproval. Arguments drawn from Scriptures seem inconclusive at best. The lone Pentateuchal source dealing with the legal status of the fetus comes from a section of Exodus dealing with the problem of miscarriage:

• When men have a fight and hurt a pregnant woman, so that she suffers a miscarriage, but no further injury, the guilty one shall be fined as much as the woman’s husband demands of him, and he shall pay in the presence of the judges. But if injury ensues, you shall give life for life” (Exod. 21:22–23).

The verse may be interpreted in a two ways:

It would seem that the Mosaic legislation considered the fetus property, and should not be viewed as living person, like its mother.  Financial compensation to the woman’s husband is determined by the judges, based on the development of the fetus. Such an interpretation has a parallel in the Hittite Laws, 17, in its treatment of the miscarriage. Most biblical translations regard verse 22 as referring to a miscarriage:

• Some scholars[1] translate v. 22-23 differently, “If men fight and hit a pregnant woman and her child is born prematurely, but there is no serious injury, he will surely be punished in accordance with what the woman’s husband demands of him, and he will pay what the court decides” (NET). The term אָסוֹן (˒āsôn) does not mean “death,” as interpreted in the Mechilta, but ought to be rendered as, “health complications,” or, “serious harm,” to the child. Accordingly, if the v. 23 may be speaking of the death of the fetus as well, and the assailant is subject to the death penalty.

Based on the latter deconstructive reading, the death of a well-developed fetus could be viewed as a capital offense. Moreover even v. 22 may not necessarily be speaking about miscarriage as such, but a pre-mature birth and would involve lesser injuries to the mother and the baby—depending upon its physical development. Thus, according to this view, the fetus could be viewed as having a status similar or identical to that of human beings.

Other ancient codes of the ancient Near East (ANE) viewed voluntary abortion in grave terms. According to the Middle Assyrian Laws dating back to 1600 B.C.E., observes that if a woman died as a result of having induced her own abortion, her body was publicly impaled and denied a proper burial.[2] Assyrians viewed this act of impaling as a form of tallionic justice on account of the mother’s murdering of her fetus. According to the laws of Lipit-ištar, as well as the Middle Assyrian Laws, if the woman dies, the man himself will be put to death.[3] The Code of Hammurabi also includes laws regarding miscarriages and determines a monetary settlement based upon the mother’s social status.[4] The Hittite laws do not deal with the cases where the mother dies. Continue Reading

* This is an older article I wrote back in 2009. So, if there is any overlap of ideas, please forgive me.

Abortion, as such, is not discussed in the Tanakh. Explanations  as to why it is not legislated or commented are at best speculative. The biblical world was much more concerned with the survival of its members, rather than with the willful termination of its unborn. Archaeological evidence suggests that in ancient Israel the infant mortality rate was about 50%.

Discussions concerning abortion are ancient indeed. The Torah imposes a fine on the assailant for causing abortion of a woman’s fetus in the course of a quarrel, and the penalty of death if the woman’s dies as a result of the assailant’s attack. “When two people who are fighting injure a pregnant woman so that there is a miscarriage, and yet no further harm follows, the one responsible shall be fined what the woman’s husband demands, paying as much as the judges determine. If any harm follows, then you shall give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe” (Exod. 21:22-23).

Ancient Discussions

If the Code of Hammurabi is of any indication, the Torah had in mind only financial damages but did not advocate the death penalty for the death of the fetus—regardless how premature or maturely it was. In Section 209: Hammurabi writes, “If a man strike a free woman and cause her fruit to depart, he shall pay ten shekels of silver for her fruit.”

Perceptions regarding the status of the embryo changed centuries later during the days of Greek culture. A new interpretation was introduced that radically transformed our understanding of the biblical text. According to the ancient Greek translation of the Scriptures, the Septuagint, the Torah decreed that under certain circumstances, the death of the fetus could be imposed for causing an abortion:

ἐὰν δὲ ἐξεικονισμένον ἦν δώσει ψυχὴν ἀντὶ ψυχῆς

[And if two men strive and smite a woman with child; and her child be born imperfectly formed, he shall be forced to pay a penalty: as the woman's husband may lay upon him, he shall pay with a valuation.] But if it be perfectly formed, he shall give life for life . . . (Exod. 21:22)

Philo of Alexandria comments on this passage of the Septuagint, “But if anyone has a contest with a woman who is pregnant, and strike her a blow on her belly, and she miscarry, if the child which was conceived within her is still unfashioned and unformed, he shall be punished by a fine, both for the assault which he committed and also because he has prevented nature, who was fashioning and preparing that most excellent of all creatures, a human being, from bringing him into existence. But if the child which was conceived had assumed a distinct shape in all its parts, having received all its proper connective and distinctive qualities, he shall die; for such a creature as that is a man, whom he has slain while still in the workshop of nature, who had not thought it as yet a proper time to produce him to the light, but had kept him like a statue lying in a sculptor’s workshop, requiring nothing more than to be released and sent out into the world.[1]

Philo juxtaposes abortion with the ancient practice of exposure. He writes: “On account of this commandment he also adds another proposition of greater importance, in which the exposure of infants is forbidden, which has become a very ordinary piece of wickedness among other nations by reason of their natural inhumanity . . .”

Josephus also regards abortion as morally akin to murder.[2] Nevertheless, in practice, he followed rabbinical tradition, “He that kicks a woman with a child, so that the woman miscarry, let him pay a fine in money, as the judges shall  determine, as having diminishing the multitude by the destruction of what was in her womb.”[3]

Josephus and Philo may have been of the opinion that the assailant had to pay two fines, one to the husband, and the second fine to charity for depriving the human race of one less person. It is also possible the Hellenistic understanding did run contrary to what later became Talmudic Halacha. Nevertheless, it does reflect the disdain Jews have had throughout history concerning abortion—at least as a method of birth-control. Given the high degree of infant-mortality, this reaction was quite understandable.

Unlike the Septuagint, Talmudic scholars maintained that the word אָסוֹן (´äsôn) “harm” refers to the woman and not to the fetus, since the scriptural injunction, “He who fatally strikes a man shall be put to death” (Exo. 21:12), did not apply to the killing of a fetus.[4] Ancient rabbis did not consider abortion a sin unless the fetus was viable בן קיימא  (ben keyama)—still and all, if the infant was so much as only  one day old , his killer is guilty of murder (Niddah. 5:3).[5]

According to the view of R. Ishmael, only a Gentile, to whom some of the basic transgressions applied with greater stringency, incurred the death penalty for causing the loss of the fetus (Sanhedrin 57b). Though abortion was frowned upon in the ancient world, it did not constitute murder.[6] In one well known Responsa of R. Yosef Trani (14th century), the author argued against a Jew assisting in an abortion, because it “places a stumbling block before the blind (Lev. 19:14).” This Halachic attitude did not apply to therapeutic abortion.

All this doesn’t necessarily mean that the rabbis had a permissive attitude concerning abortion. Clearly, it wasn’t. Thus we find in one medieval Midrashic work that Israel is praised because in spite of Pharaoh’s genocidal decree, in Egypt, “Every boy that is born you shall throw into the Nile,  (Exod. 1:22), “Not one Israelite woman so much as harmed her foetus, much less after its birth. By virtue of their reverence for life, Israel merited the exodus” (Zohar II 3b).

Abortion is permitted if the fetus endangers the mother’s life. The Mishnah reads: “When a woman travails to give birth [and it is feared she may die], one may sever the fetus from her womb and extract it, member by member, for her life takes precedence over his”[7 This is the case only as long as the foetus has not emerged into the world, when it is not a life at all and “it may be killed and the mother saved.”[8] Once the birthing process has begun,  if the greater part of the fetus has emerged into the world-either its head only, or its breach—it may not be touched, even if it endangers the mother’s life  אין דוחין נפש מפני נפש (ein dohin nefesh mi-penei nefesh) “one may not discard one life to save another.”

In another passage of the Talmud, a newborn child is not considered to be viable, until it has lived for 30 days![9] How do we reconcile this passage with the above?

Back to the Future: Contemporary Perspectives

Rav Ben Tsion Uziel, the late Chief Sephardic Rabbi, observes in his Responsa, “When a child dies within 30 days, it is considered as if it was a stillborn and is not mourned for like a person who has died. It becomes evident only in retrospect, that it was stillborn [nofale] and that the period of its life was only a continuation of the mother’s vitality. Since there was no way to ascertain whether the foetus was indeed stillborn or not, it is not a crime one can be executed for because of doubt. Nevertheless, it is certainly prohibited to kill it because of doubt.”[10] This passage of Ben Uziel does have ramifications to another area of Halacha pertaining to discontinuing life-support mechanisms for a  seriously impaired newborn baby. A more contemporary  scholar, Rav Abraham Steinberg, notes “when in doubt, it is better to error in favor of life.”

Just to digress, it is interesting to note  that in a similar way, Christian theologian Augustine raised a key question in his own time, as it is now, was “at what time the infant begins to live in the womb; whether life exists in a latent form before it manifests itself in the motions of the living being.” Augustine admits that he cannot assuredly say at exactly what point human life begins. He seriously questions whether any human has the power to decisively say. Nevertheless, he asserts that anyone who looked at the cut-up remains of an aborted baby would have to recognize that this had been a human life. Although Augustine apparently had a firm belief that a developing foetus participates in human life, he argues equally strongly here that a conclusive proof is outside our human ability. There is some leniency if for example, the abortion will save the mother from an  illness deriving from an inflammation not connected with the pregnancy, or a poisonous fever . . . in these cases the fetus is not [per se] the cause of her illness.”[11]

Among modern Halachic authorities, psychological reasons are also a factor to allow abortions. The great 18th century Halachic giant,  Rabbi Yaakov  Emden, permitted abortion “as long as the foetus has not emerged from the womb, even if not in order to save the mother’s life, but only to save her from the harassment and great pain which the foetus causes her.[12]

One early 20th century scholar, Rav Ben Tsion Uziel, rules in favor of allowing an abortion in order to save the mother’s hearing, even though her life was not endangered. Disgrace and the quality of life are a very important factor to take into consideration when deciding whether one is undergo an abortion.[13] In the case of pregnancy resulting from incest, or any adulterous union, the 18^th century savant, R. Yaakov Emden, permitted abortion so that the stigma of bastardy be attached to her offspring.[14]

With regard to the dreaded Tay-Sachs disease, Rav Eliezer Waldenberg permits the abortion, since as he writes in his Responsa: “One should permit abortion as soon as it becomes obvious from the results of the test that the child is indeed, a Tay-Sach’s baby will be born—even until the seventh month of pregnancy. If we are able to permit abortion according to the Halacha because of great need and because of pain and anguish, it seems reasonable that this is the classic case for extending such permission. And it is irrelevant in what way pain and suffering is expressed; whether it be physical or psychological—It is all the same. Indeed, psychological suffering in many ways in greater than the bodily suffering.”[15]

R. Eliezer Waldenberg also notes that whenever possible, all such abortions should be performed within the first forty days of the pregnancy or at least within the first three months.[16] Pope Gregory XIII [1572-85) expresses a similar view, and wrote that an embryo less than forty days was not yet considered human. Incidentally,  it was only in 1869, Pope Pius IX who along with this doctrine of infallibility, decreed that the destruction of an embryo—even to save the mother’s life — was a mortal sin that merited excommunication from the Church.[17]

Many Orthodox scholars differ and are of the view that Jewish law prohibits abortion when its sole justification is to prevent the birth of a physically deformed or retarded baby. Likewise, abortion—on demand—purely for the convenience of the mother or even society is considered morally repugnant.”[18]

Suffice it to say as in any Halachic matter, there is no carte blanche answer for every conceivable case in Halacha—especially with regard to abortion.  Every case must be determined by its own unique circumstances. A competent rabbi should be able to help guide any person who is wrestling with this important decision. There is no one answer for such a complex issue as abortion. Continue Reading