Book Review — Very Near to You: Human Readings of the Torah

Avraham Burg is an interesting personality. He challenges the religious and sensibilities of the Orthodox and Jewish world. Burg is also a leader in the Israeli peace movement. He served two terms in the Israeli Knesset. Over the years, he has emerged as one of Israel’s most articulate advocates for religious pluralism, women’s rights, ecological issues—not to mention—Israeli and Palestinian peace. At times, Avraham Burg almost sounds like a modern day biblical prophet.

His newest book, “Very Near To You: Human Readings of the Torah,” (Jerusalem: Gefen, 2012) captures many of his seminal ideas on the weekly Torah portion. Burg calls it the way he sees it. His philosophical insights expose a part of the text that towers above his competition. Whereas many of today’s rabbinical scholars extol the virtues of midrashic expositions, Burg challenges the reader to question everything—including the sacred text itself. He does not slavishly accept traditional sources simply because they are canonized as “traditional.”

You will not find Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik or Nechama Leibowitz engage in the type of postmodern deconstructions of the biblical text that Burg does in “Very Near To You.” Burg’s honesty is refreshing. He is not afraid to say that certain biblical stories strike today’s readers as morally problematic for a contemporary sensibility.

So, in the interest of brevity, let us examine one well-known biblical story Burg examines that characterizes his original thought: The story of Noah. Burg admits in the beginning, that he really didn’t care that much for Noah. Rabbinical wisdom teaches that Noah pales in comparison to other biblical personalities who, “spoke to God, fought with him, complemented Him…compared to them, Noah would not have been ‘considered at all’” (p. 12). However, Burg comes up with a wonderful novelty, “Noah is neither a lawgiver or a prophetical voice. Noah belongs among people who build and do. Noah is a pioneer, not an intellectual a manual worker rather than a noted philosopher…”

Ditto. Noah’s greatness is precisely because of his humanity. The Torah describes Noah as a “righteous man,” which happens to be an awful translation. The Hebrew term ish tsadik really means, “a man of integrity,”  or simply, “a just man.” Since the time of Webster’s  Dictionary,  the term “righteous” implies piety, but it really connotes someone who acts with total and complete integrity. Hassidic and Haredi tend to focus on Noah’s religious piety, and overlook the significance of Noah as a “a man of integrity.” As Jewish ethical literature teaches, the acquisition of personal integrity must come before one attains piety.[1] When you consider the violent and unjust times Noah lived in, his moral achievement was no small accomplishment. To use a modern example of Noahide integrity, imagine a Palestinian standing up for Israel in the streets of Gaza–that’s the kind of moral fortitude Noah possesses. He may not be a prophet, but his dignity and personal integrity stand out in a crowd.

Noah’s realism and love for the earth enables him to save it from destruction. “Without Noah,” contends Burg, “there can be no Abraham.” Burg cites the well-known Mishnah, ‘If there is no flour, there can be no Torah—that is, learning and culture cannot survive without the bare essentials of life. By this measure, Noah was the flour; only in his wake could Abraham come with his Torah, his message of revealed truth” (p. 14).

The best part of Burg’s exposition of Noah is how he compares the Flood narrative to the Holocaust. Personally, I have always found this part of the narrative most disturbing. Let’s be honest: Noah probably thought God was a mass-murderer! How can anyone relate to a Deity, Who is deeply out of control with His emotions? Burg is certainly aware of the moral problems posed by the ancient biblical text. As to be expected,  Burg totally rejects any effort to view the Flood story as historical truth. For him, it is all about metaphor that depicts God’s relationship with Creation. Burg makes a stunning observation and claims that God behaves “childishly” by creating man to be an automaton, who obediently responds to God’s every command:

  • When man deviated from his assigned path, God became enraged and banished him. He took the ball back and didn’t want to play anymore, so to speak. In this week’s portion that process repeats itself on a global scale. The creator rebukes himself, regrets the creation and, saddened to his core, lashes out murderously: I will blot out man whom I have created from the face of the earth’ (Gen. 6:7). Only much later does God mature, change, relax, and become the God who is patient with his world and his faithful. At this stage every solution that occurs to him is violent, homicidal, and vengeful: the expulsion from the Garden of Eden, the Flood, the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, the killing of the firstborn sons, and so on.”

Burg goes on to mention how some (actually many!) rabbinical scholars liken the Holocaust to the Flood. However, Burg contends that the scholars are mistaken for, “In the Flood, humankind had nothing to say because God wasn’t listening. By contrast, the Holocaust was not an act of God, but a destructive act of man who did not hear a thing. How is the God who once utterly destroyed the world by flood different from the God who didn’t intervene in Hitler’s flood?”

The questions he raises are wonderful. In my new volume on Genesis 4-11, I raise similar questions. There is a theological message that might have made Burg’s exposition of the Flood narrative that much more compelling. Simply put, “The Torah speaks in the language of humankind.” Why is this relevant? When the Torah says, “And the LORD was sorry that he had made humankind on the earth,” this is an example of how the human mind imagines the workings of the Divine Mind. The biblical statement really says more about our flawed image of God.

The 18th century Italian commentator and thinker, Shmuel David Luzzato offers a remarkable perspective that deals with Burg’s straightforward questions. Luzzato contends that when the prophet wrote this narrative down, he spoke in an idiom that the people of his generation could understand.” This is a bold statement, for Maimonides, Ibn Ezra, and Philo of Alexandria arrived at the same conclusion. Moses evokes the imagery of curses and calamity because he wants the Israelites to walk the straight and narrow path.

Remember: our ancestors were not philosophers, nor were they theologians. The carrot and the stick theology  found in Deuteronomy’s list of  biblical curses were written for an unsophisticated generation. When you hear religious leaders evoke the “wrath of God” theology when speaking about the Holocaust, Katrina, the Tsunami, or whatever–you get the impression we have not evolved very much since the days of Noah and Moses.

As people evolve, so too does the concept of God also evolve. As the Sages say, “The Torah speaks in the language of man.” Language is never static; it is dynamic, communicative, alive and capable of eternal expression.

Abraham Isaac Kook’s insight about the nature of God language says much about the evolutionary direction that differentiates the God of the Flood vis-à-vis the God of Psalm 23, who is described as a shepherd and companion. Kook notes, “All the ideological arguments among people and all the inner conflicts that every individual suffers in his own world outlook are caused by a confused conception of God . . . .One must always cleanse one’s thoughts about God to make sure they are free of the dross of deceptive fantasies, of groundless fear, of evil inclinations, of wants and inadequacies. Faith in God must enhance human happiness . . . . When the duty to honor God is conceived of in an enlightened manner, it raises human worth and the worth of all creatures, filling them with largeness of spirit, combined with genuine humility. But a crude conception of God tends toward the idolatrous, and degrades the dignity of man and of other beings  . . .” [2]

Does this mean that the God of the Flood is hopelessly incompatible with the God of Psalm 23, Abraham Isaac Kook, or for that matter Maimonides and the mystics? Well, sort of . . . As Burg intimates, the story of the Flood is really a parable. Although Burg does not always make it crystal clear what the parable represents, this ancient story really says a lot the human conception of God. and how it has evolved. By the end of the story (Gen. 9), God rescinds much of his authority to accommodate human freedom.

Erich Fromm has often said, the story of Noah reveals how an impetuous God becomes a constitutional monarch, who learns to rule by law. In his pericope on the Flood, Burg mentions nothing about the covenant God makes with Noah after the Flood. This is an unfortunate omission on Burg’s part. God enters into a covenant with humankind that obligates both parties to work out their differences. Human responsibility represents the new standard for justice. Human beings– from this point forward–are and will forever be responsible for human generated evil that exists in the world—and not God.

Burg’s concluding remarks presents a vision that I wholeheartedly endorse; he writes,

  • The new Torahs that emerge from the Holocaust must point the way toward the shaping of a better humanity, toward teachings that do not give rise to victimizers like the Nazis nor permit victims to be destroyed as were—as the Gypsies, gays who were there with us, as the Armenians before us and the slaughtered of Rwanda and Cambodia after us. The new theology, particularly, the Jewish one, must break through the boundaries of the old faith . . . The time has come for the faith of Noah and his commitment to repairing the world; the time of beliefs in destruction, whether divine or human, is over (p. 17).

Burg’s treatment of the Akedah (“Binding of Isaac,” see Gen. 22) is also interesting; he names that sub-chapter, “Abraham’s Great Failure.” This section did not reveal anything new that I did not hear before. Burg accuses Abraham of failing the test, and he uses an old but familiar approach championed by Kant, the Sefat Emet, Emil Fackenheim, and more recently—Rabbi Shlomo Riskin. Like the others, Burg claims that after the Akedah, God never spoke to Abraham again. I often wonder: How can modern scholars claim to understand the mind of a biblical narrator, or for that matter–God? The Torah only contains a partial disclosure of Abraham and God’s relationship–and nothing more.

As one who has also written extensively on this topic, I believe there is much more to the story of the Akedah than what the postmodernists are willing to admit. Unfortunately, due to time constraints, we will have to tackle this topic at some future date.

Many of Burg’s expositions are wonderful and the way he engages the biblical stories will challenge and renew your spirit. There is a great prophetic and ethical message he brings to the sacred text. What more could you possibly want from such an outstanding book?

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Identifying Nimrod in the Bible

The identity of Nimrod continues to be an enigma. Five different approaches have been pursued.  The first identifies Nimrod as a god, usually the Mesopotamian god of hunting and war Ninurta or Marduk; both these names are phonetically similar to the Nimrod’s name. Jewish tradition connects Nimrod’s name נִמְרֹד (literally “we shall revolt”) with the verb מָרַד (m¹rad = “to rebel” or “revolt”). The rabbis regarded Nimrod as the mastermind of the Tower of Babel. Under Nimrod’s rule (v. 10), all the various Mesopotamian city-states became consolidated. Other speculations include:

Some scholars think that Nimrod was Gilgamesh, the legendary leader who ruled the S. Mesopotamian city of Uruk around 2600 B.C.E. and was thus a contemporary of Agga, the ruler of Kish.  Gilgamesh was believed to be two-thirds god and one-third human. According to some of the Sumerian legends about Gilgamesh, he was a Semitic, who lived during the Second Early Dynastic period who fortified Uruk (biblical Erech, modern Warka) and went on to defeat King Agga of Kish (cf. ANET, pp. 44–52).

Gilgamesh is also mentioned in the Sumerian list of kings as reigning after the flood and parallels Nimrod as the first king to rule after the Flood.  In terms of Assyrian mythology, Gilgamesh was regarded as a demigod who imposed his will upon his subjects, reducing them to forced labor, causing them to suffer under his tyranny. Like Nimrod of later rabbinic tradition, Gilgamesh was said to be a mighty builder. Gilgamesh’s subjects prayed that the gods would send him a rival who would curb Gilgamesh’s harsh rule. Among his exploits, Gilgamesh would fight against monsters and wild beasts alike.

In the third approach Nimrod has been equated with an historical personage, possibly Tukulti-Ninurta I, an Assyrian king who reigned c. 1238-c. 1197 B.C.E. Tukulti-Ninurta I established  Assyrian supremacy over King Kashtiliash IV, ruler of the Kassites to the southeast  of his country (about the Persian Gulf), and subjugated ancient Armenia to the northeast. For a short time, Tukulti-Ninurta became the first Assyrian king to rule over Babylon. Among his accomplishments, Tukulti-Ninurta I erected a noted ziggurat temple to the goddess Ishtar-Dinitu (“Ishtar of the Dawn”) that served as a model for Assyrian architecture.[1]

Wiseman has suggested a possible fourth approach, namely, that Nimrod resembles Sargon I of Akkad (reigned c. 2334-2279 B.C.E.), who was one of the earliest of the world’s great empire builders. The extension of Nimrod’s kingdom from southern Mesopotamia (Gen.10:10) to northern Mesopotamia (Gen. 10:11) parallels the growth of the first known empire in history, the dynasty of Akkad.

According to the Sumerian king list, the first five rulers of Akkad (Sargon, Rimush, Manishtusu, Naram-Sin, and Shar-kali-sharric. 2305-2000  B.C.E.) ruled for a total of 142 years;  Sargon and Naram-Sin (about 2300  B.C.E.), were among the greatest of the heroic kings of old.  Sargon I conquered all of southern Mesopotamia as well as parts of Syria, Anatolia, and Elam (Western Iran) The Sumerian king list has Sargon I reigning for 56 years. He established the region’s first Semitic dynasty and was considered the founder of the Mesopotamian military tradition. Although his throne name was Sargon I, he may have had other names.[2]

Lastly, Nimrod may be related to the Akkadian word for the Amorite kingdom, Amurru. Cassuto thinks that Nimrod may have been an Amorite conqueror who conquered the city of Asshur, the capital of the Assyrian kingdom c. 19th century B.C.E.   The Ammaru were also believed to have been partly responsible for causing of the downfall of the 3rd dynasty of Ur and Akkad at the beginning of the second millennium (c. 2112 — 2004 B.C.E.).  The Amorites are believed to have originated from the great tribal federations of Arabia who immigrated en masse to Babylon, as well as to the mid-Euphrates region, and Syria-Palestine.

Whether Nimrod was indeed the same person as Gilgamesh, Sargon I or Tukulti-Ninurta I, is subject to conjecture, but one thing for certain — Nimrod became the  true archetype of  Assyrian monarchs who followed and belongs to the sphere of Babylonian mythology.[3]

It might seem odd that Nimrod, a son of Cush, a Hamite would establish the region’s first Semitic dynasty, but one must remember that there was considerable intermingling in the families of Shem and Ham and all the peoples of Mesopotamia as seen in the languages and in the architecture. If the Table of Nations was written 7th- 10th centuries B.C.E., then the biblical writers probably had in mind the mighty Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian emperors who ruled the world with an iron fist. That explanation seems like the most plausible. Continue Reading

The Linguistic Constructions of Halachic Reality (Updated)


Tap running waterOne of the most respected Chabad authorities on kosher food, who is also the chief rabbi of a haredi city in Israel, has banned the use of tap water on Shabbat.

When I first learned about the prohibition about not using a faucet on the Shabbat, I immediately speculated about its rationale. Well, the Freudian might discern a different motive behind the latest restriction: Could it possibly lead to mixed dancing?

Thank God, not this time.

Bnei Brak’s Rabbi Moshe Yehuda Leib Landa issued a halachic ruling that using a faucet directly turns on electrical water pumping system. Such an offense is, according to a number of Haredi scholars, potentially punishable by stoning.

Actually, there is an interesting aspect to this news story that most of you may not know. Rabbi Landa used to be one of my Talmud mentors in the yeshiva where I studied.

At any rate, I have personally written about this topic as well over the years. He is partially correct if you accept his premise that electricity is on par with lighting a fire—a view that has been disputed by many scholars over the last 130 years.

Some of the key arguments made for banning electricity include:

  • Igniting a fire—This is perhaps the most widely perceived attitude. They argue that an incandescent light generates light and heat by causing an electrical current to flow through a metal filament. Some scholars liken this point to the method “tempering metal” that is mentioned in the Talmud. If one  accidentally tempered a pot’s metal, scholars debate whether this is indeed permitted or not—even if the person never intended to produce such a result (BT Shabbat 41b).
  • Building— Rabbi Avrohom Yeshaya Karelitz, (1878-1953) a.k.a, “ Chazon Ish,” argued that closing an electrical circuit to create current constitutes a biblical prohibition, while closing a circuit is analogous to the prohibited act of destroying. Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (1910-1995) rejects such an analogy, contending that opening and closing an electrical circuit is no different from opening or closing a door on the Sabbath. Rabbi Auerbach was regarded by many people to be the greatest Halachic scholar of his generation.[1]
  • “Striking the final hammer blow” i.e., making a device operational, for a device does not become complete until the electricity is turned on! Once again, Rabbi Auerbach rejects this exposition. Functionally speaking, an electrical appliance is by its very purpose—temporary. Once it is turned on, it requires minimal effort to reactivate it.
  • “Creating sparks” –Some argue that electrical appliances might create sparks, and that constitutes “creating a fire.” But Rabbi Auerbach retorts, “Not so! The lighting of sparks is unintentional and might not occur. Moreover, sparks are too small to be considered “final.” With solid-state technology, the probability of generating sparks is greatly reduced!”
  • Custom (Minhag)  – Rabbi Auerbach concludes that since most people think electricity on the Shabbat is forbidden, one should not alter the public perception. The only thing one should not turn on is an incandescent light, which he equates with lighting a fire. One of my members is a nuclear engineer. According to him, it is impossible for electrical sparks to be considered, “fire,” since fire requires oxidization in order achieve combustion;  in contrast, electrical sparks can occur virtually anywhere in the cosmos.
  • One might argue that electricity functions more like the element of water and not fire. Unless one is talking about the solar storms that occur on the sun, we generally refer to electricity having both a “current” and a “flow.” Apply Rabbi Auerbach’s reasoning, turning on a light switch is no different from turning on a faucet.

With respect to creating sparks, one can generate between 1500 and 3500 volts just walking across your carpet! I suspect wearing rubber shoes might solve the problem, but this hardly seems like a practical solution for those who really worry about making electricity on the Shabbat. Then again, the human brain is also electrical. Cells use electricity to communicate and stimulate muscles, but the brain takes this to another level. If you could take the brain’s electricity, tap into all the electricity the neurons are generating, you’d have enough power to turn on a flashlight.

By the same line of reasoning, the heart is also electrical. Rabbinical reasoning never imagined that everything that is human runs on electricity–even on the Shabbat!

One might argue that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s theory of “language as game” may help make some sort of sense out of the rabbinical debate concerning the halachic status of electricity. Wittgenstein notes:

  •  But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and command?—There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call ”symbols”, “words”, “sentences”. And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten…Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following examples, and in others: Giving orders, and obeying them—Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements—Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)—Reporting an event—Speculating about an event—Forming and testing a hypothesis—Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams—Making up a story; and reading it—Play-acting—Singing catches—Guessing riddles—Making a joke; telling it—Solving a problem in practical arithmetic—Translating from one language into another—Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying. (PI, 1953, 11–12).

Based on the way Talmudic and discussions operate, I think Wittgenstein’s notion of game theory describes the essential interpretive relativism that is linguistically embedded in Halachic thinking. Simply put: rabbis love creating linguistic walls to construct around their communities. Walls serve to isolate as well as protect their followers from secular, or contrarian Orthodox counter-values, which the rabbis find threatening. The Mishnah often speaks about the importance of “making a fence around the Torah” (Aboth 1:1). However, when you make fences around fences ad infinitum, you have effectively created a labyrinth (also known as a maze). People who let the rabbis micromanage their lives, remain prisoners (for the most part!) in a world fabricated by their own artifice.

R. Yaakob Kranz [2] (1741-1804) once compared the halachic process to someone trying to shoot a bull’s-eye. This can be achieved in one of two ways:

One way involves using skill to hit the center of the target. The other method involves shooting at a random target and then painting concentric circles around wherever the arrow lands. Rabbinic thinking, more often than not, tends to arbitrarily use straw man arguments for the prohibitions they wish to promote. This is especially true with how many of today’s Haredi and Hassidic scholars arrive at foregone conclusions, which will not stand up to logical scrutiny, or for that matter–common sense.

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The Courage to Speak and Honor One’s Truth . . .

Chaim Levin closeup

Courage is what it takes to stand up and speak; courage is also what it takes to sit down and listen–Winston Churchill

Over the years, many of us regarded the Jewish Press as the Orthodox answer to the National Enquirer. Mind you, the Enquirer is quite entertaining. However, nobody really takes the Enquirer that seriously, unless you happen to be an UFO or X-Files enthusiast.

Over the years, the Jewish Press has produced some interesting stories; and there was a time when I subscribed to it. Lately, the Jewish Press surprised me. Recently, they published an autobiographical article about a gay Orthodox Jew, named Chaim Levin. Chaim grew up in a well-respected Hassidic home located in Brooklyn’s Crown Heights. The young man wanted to share his story about living in an Orthodox world that wishes he would go back and hide in the closet.

Chaim recalls, “Saying that Hashem would never make a gay person unable to change is simplistic, inconsistent and flat-out wrong. If someone gets into an accident we would never say that we know he can be ‘cured’ simply because his affliction is not genetic and he wasn’t born this way. We would never tell a deaf person (born deaf or not) that his nisayon (ordeal) is to find a way to hear again, so that he can be mekayem (fulfill) the mitzvah of shofar? Yet the Torah Declaration uses all of these arguments to make gay people feel that their nisayon in life is to change their sexuality, simply because it may not be genetic and Hashem would never make it unchangeable. This is the worst kind of rationalized homophobia.”

Despite spending thousands of dollars in therapy to break Chaim of his homosexuality, Chaim realized his parents’ effort to change him was a waste of time. Chaim needed to make peace with his own conscience and so he did.

Chaim’s message is so eloquently simple: “I am simply asking my community not to judge . . . Just because someone is honest about being gay, does not mean that he engages in any sin or chillul Hashem (religious scandal). No one should feel silenced or asked to lie about who they are . . . A little humility goes a long way. Sometimes the kindest and most thoughtful response when it comes to very difficult situations is, ‘I don’t know, but I’m here for you because you are part of my family and community.’”

What does Chaim want? He wants the gift of Presence. He wants people to see and respect his humanity. It is a pity people in many religious communities, e.g., Jewish, Christian, Muslim, regard the gay worshiper as an affront to their values and belief system. In a community where conformity and fitting in are extremely important, you have to admire young Chaim for speaking his truth for all to see and hear.

The loss of human life is especially tragic whenever a young gay Orthodox or Hassidic Jew commits suicide out of a feeling of desperation, loneliness, and hopelessness. There have been numerous suicides in the Orthodox communities of Israel and New York—all because a community refuses to walk its talk about, “Loving your fellow Jew,” even though it is “the basis of our holy Torah.” A couple of years ago, one Haredi rabbi even suggested that if an Orthodox homosexual Jew cannot overcome his “evil inclination,” he should commit suicide! I am certain the Mullahs in Iran would love to offer that kind of “encouragement” to the gay members of their own religious community.

I want to extend kudos to the Editor of the Jewish Press for showing the courage to publish an article that is creating shock-waves within his community. The Jewish Press has received all sorts of threats from a number of its readers. Some of the advertisers have been approached by zealots, telling them to, “Stop advertising, or else!” As the editor wrote his in latest op-ed piece, “A situation where religious Jews are provoking children and adults who are different, to consider suicide is unthinkable and unacceptable.”

So far the advertisers are standing tall and strong and will not back down.

Yes, the Jewish Press is showing the world what real Jewish values are all about. Continue Reading

Creative Gun Control Legislation: Psychological Testing?!

Over a year has passed since the terrible Arizona shooting, when a gunman opened fire, killing six people and wounding 13 others.  Gabrielle Giffords, a conservative Democrat representing Arizona’s Eighth District, was among those wounded. She remained in critical condition after she survived a single gunshot to the head fired at point-blank range. Within three days after the shooting, one of her doctors described her chances of survival as “101 percent.” Her neurosurgeon, Dr. Dong Kim, called her progress “almost miraculous.”

We are all blessed with her recovery, but  greater challenges lie ahead for Gabrielle and ourselves as a nation, which sometimes teeters on the edge of insanity.

We wonder: Have we learned anything new from this devastating experience?

One bill that appeared before Congress proposed that the House of Representatives “reduce” the time allowed for criminal background checks. The Senate asked for a three-business day waiting period. The amended Bill in the House proposed a 24 hour waiting period. The reason: gun shows are very popular during the weekends. They argue that there would be no time to conduct a background check on people wishing to purchase arms.

Oh really?!

I think our politicians are living in Chelm, a place in Jewish history reserved for fools who think they are wise. If somebody wishes to purchase firearms at a convention, why don’t the new purchasers take the test one week before the gun show? What is wrong with this picture?

Over the last decade and a half, more and more states are starting to require psychological testing as a condition of hiring any full time police officer. Given the immense stress of the job, this decision makes perfect sense. In fact, schools across the country now require psychological testing for its faculty members. Even Wal-Mart requires psychological testing for its workers—perhaps because they sell firearms at their stores.

Now, it seems to me that the recent Arizona shooting might have been avoided had the state required psychological testing for anyone wishing to own a gun. In fact, if every state required psychological testing, we might be able to cut down the number of accidental shootings, or even willful shootings that seem to occur every year in our great nation.

One cannot expect a family to recognize or, for that matter, even be willing to admit that their son may have deep-rooted psychological problems requiring professional help. In addition, I think the question of machine guns, semi-automatic weapons, assault-rifles, and similar type weapons should be banned except for the military or police. Private individuals do not need to act like Rambo when a vagrant is breaking into their home. [1]

In Judaism, safety is a religious concern. The Bible requires that a roof be properly gated, in order to prevent people from falling off of it (Deut. 22:8). One precept in particular is especially important, “You shall not curse the deaf; you shall not put a stumbling block before the blind, but you will fear your God; I am YHWH ” (Lev. 19:14).

This verse includes two types of prohibitions: (1) placing a stumbling block in front of the blind for sport or entertainment, (2) taking advantage of someone’s ignorance–especially for pecuniary gain. The verse stresses that a God fearing person will not take advantage of anyone for any reason.

By the expression, “God fearing,” this is the biblical way of describing a moral person who acts with a reverence toward life. God-fearing also indicates that Creator and Judge of the world will hold all such offenders accountable for disrespecting human life. Authentic piety is best reflected by acts of compassion and consideration–especially toward individuals who suffer from a serious disability–whether physical, emotional, intellectual, and psychological. [2]

It is also instructive that Maimonides asserts that enabling someone to commit a crime, (e.g., the individual who offers a bribe, or offers to pay interest on a loan) violates the above biblical dictum.[3]

In light of the Arizona shooting—or for that matter, any other well-known shootings that we have seen in recent history, the Columbine or Virginia Tech incidents—the onus of responsibility cannot be placed on someone who is mentally-impaired or schizophrenic, or someone suffering from psychotic-break with reality.

It is not realistic to expect psychotics like Jared Lee Loughner to behave like normal citizens. I expect the judge will send him to a special hospital for the criminally insane. Local courts and governments have a duty to make it as difficult as possible in determining who can and ought to own a gun. Certain individuals should never own a gun of any kind. The duty to protect citizens is the government’s responsibility.

I would argue that we apply the same standards that exist for other professionals in our country also be applied to anyone wishing to own a gun. The time has come for the gun-lobby to start leading the campaign to protect the country from individuals who endanger public welfare. Ultimately, such a responsible move will not diminish the constitutional rights of owning a gun–but such sensible legislation will enable all of us to breathe easier

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Honor Killings in Antiquity (2/2)

  • History of Honor Killings and Mutilations

None of us are products of the present. The values of past generations, along with their history, continue to shape and structure the contemporary psyche of people everywhere in the world.

In this brief article, I wish to provide a sketch about the history of honor killings. In Carol Delancy’s amazing book, “Abraham on Trial,” the author examines the story of the Akedah–the “Binding of Isaac,” which she claims, really extols the virtues of patriarchal power. Delancy argues that in Middle Eastern societies–ancient and modern–the sacrifice of children more than the protection of children, has become the focus of their faith. Her underlying premise has important implications for how we might understand this dangerous phenomena that continues to haunt the 21st century.

The history of honor killings can be found in the annals of antiquity. According to ancient Roman law, if a woman had been raped by a rebellious slave, her reputation was for all practical purposes destroyed The Romans considered the honor killing as a “merciful act.” If a husband caught his wife in an adulterous relationship, the wife’s fate was subject to the whim of her husband.

The first king of Rome, Romulus, is said to have allowed the death penalty for women who committed adultery or drank wine.  Roman law also permitted the father to execute his children if they were guilty of adultery based on the Julian law regarding adultery (Lex Iulia de adulteriis) that was passed in around 18 CE during the reign of Augustus. [2] Emperor Nero divorced his wife Octavia in 62 CE, alleging that she had committed adultery; however, the evidence was scanty. Nevertheless, the court banished Octavia to Pandateria. Nero ordered his soldiers to slowly execute her, and within a few days, they brought back her head to Nero.[1] The Emperor soon married Poppaea, who incidentally is believed to have later converted to Judaism! Seneca and other playwrights often lampooned Nero’s disposal of his ex-wife. Just imagine what the Romans would have done, had they invented television!

The Greek historian and Roman citizen Plutarch (c. 46 – 120 C.E.) quotes a well known aphorism from the Athenian statesman Solon 638 B.C.E.– 558 B.C.E.), “We keep mistresses for our pleasures, concubines for constant attendance, and wives to bear us legitimate children and to be our faithful housekeepers. . . .” He adds, “Yet, because of the wrong done to the husband only, the Athenian lawgiver Solon allowed any man to kill an adulterer whom he had taken in the act.”

Mutilation of female adulterers occurred in Babylon, China, Egypt, as well as among Native American Indian cultures. The list goes on–wherever men “own” their wives, this type of abuse has occurred. In Muslim countries, it is still a common occurrence. [3]

The common feature in almost all honor killings is the idea that the Other is the property of the aggrieved spouse.  It is startling that women are not considered persons; they are considered chattel and are perceived as bereft of an identity independent of the husband.

The Bible itself contains numerous stories dealing with honor killings that illustrate our last point. For example, Dinah’s massacre of the Shechemites in Genesis 34 meets all the criteria regarding an honor killing, but in this instance the brothers take their rage out on Dinah’s lover, Shechem and his immediate community. Tamar is nearly burned at the stake by her self-righteous father-in-law, Judah, for having shamed the family. Tamar knew Judah was an ethically challenged individual.  Were it not for Tamar’s anticipation of this possible outcome, she would have been killed (Gen. 38:24).

One of the most important pieces of biblical legislation pertains to the wife who is accused of adultery (Num. 5:11-31). An elaborate trial takes place that ultimately prevents her murder. Despite the primitive background of the precept, the ritual of the Sotah  probably saved many female lives.

Perhaps even more disturbing is the abundance of Scriptural imagery where God goes after Israel for having worshiped idols. In exacting retribution, God strips Israel naked, and subjects her to all kinds of, presumably, sexual abuse at the hand of her lovers (Ezek. 16:37-40).

God also resorts to mutilation, for in Ezekiel 23, God says in v. 25, “I will leave it to them to judge, and they will judge you by their own ordinances. I will let loose my jealousy against you, so that they shall deal with you in fury, cutting off your nose and ears; and what is left of you shall fall by the sword. They shall take away your sons and daughters, and what is left of you shall be devoured by fire” (Ezek. 23:25).

Mark Twain once said, “I have no problem with those parts of the Bible I don’t understand. It’s those parts of the Bible I do understand that gives me fits.

Amen!

When you look at the mutilation that has taken place in Arab countries, the imagery of husbands abusing their wives, or other female family members is sickening.[7] In both psychological and theological terms, abusive imagery of God often functions as the template for how males interact with females.

The Bible sometimes becomes a template for the idolization of masculine power. Men assume the role of “God,” who possesses the power of life and death over a hapless victim. Is maleness the closest thing to Godliness? I don’t think so. Women can create life from their bodies, just like God creates life out of Her body (so to speak!).

While none of us can change the past, we can change the present and create a new and hopeful future for oppressed women wherever they may be. As of late, we have been receiving a lot of hits on this website from Egypt. For all those wishing to promote democracy in Egypt, there can be no true democratic reforms anywhere without  ensuring equal rights for women. Do not let the Sha’ria Law take away your freedom and dreams for a healthy Egypt. In Israel, we have a similar problem with the Ultra-Orthodox. Standing together with one powerful voice will make the status quo think twice about their ambitions to control the thoughts and soul of  a people.

*

Notes:

[1] Richard Bauman, Crime and Punishment in Ancient Rome (NY: Routledge, 1996), 89-90.

[2] Rebecca Langlands, Sexual Morality in Ancient Rome (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 20.

[3] http://atlasshrugs2000.typepad.com/atlas_shrugs/2009/03/honor-killing-islams-gruesome-gallery.html

 

Honor Killings 1/2

Kingston, Ontario was once a quiet peaceful community. That all changed when Mohammad Shafia, his wife, and son decided to murder the girls of their family. When he discovered his daughters sending pictures of themselves posing in bras and panties to their boyfriends, he said, “They betrayed humankind. They betrayed Islam. They betrayed our religion; they betrayed everything! I say to myself, ‘You did well.’ Were they to come to life, I would do it again. May the devil s— on their graves!”[1]

This case shocked and captivated the Canadian nation. This past Sunday, the court arrived at a verdict: Mohammad Shafia, his wife Tooba Mohammad Yahya and their son Hamed Mohammad Shafia had each been found guilty of four counts of first-degree murder. Justice Robert Maranger put it best when he said, “It’s difficult to conceive of a more heinous, more despicable, more honor-less crime.”

If this story interests you, read on.

The tragic murder of three female family members in Canada is a grim reminder that honor killings are still a problem even in the 21st century. Male family members may attack a female family member for a variety of reasons, e.g., for refusing to enter into an arranged marriage, for having been raped or sexually assaulted, for allegedly wanting to leave an abusive husband.

Although the Mohammad Shafia trial has attracted considerable attention in the Western press, in the Arab world, honor killings are routine and considered normal behavior—even in the 21st century. Honor killings exist in many Muslim countries with the tacit approval of local law enforcement agencies and clerics. Muslim women live with a deep-seated fear of their male family members. To most of us living in the West, this is a foreign concept most of us cannot understand.

Among the Palestinians, the Palestinian Authority, exempt men from facing any punishment if a male family member kills a female family member for “dishonoring” the family. Despite Abbas’s promise to eliminate this exemption, he has not undertaken any action.[2] Like American politicians, Abbas is skilled in the art of double-speak: say one thing to pander to the rabble, but do the exact opposite!

According to the UNICEF, about two-thirds of all the murders in the Palestinian territories are due to honor killings.[3] Men feel killing these “shameless” women removes the shame of adultery from the family.[4] The majority of the honor killings occur in rural villages, where the majority of its inhabitants are uneducated and live in squalor. Prior to Israel’s departure from Gaza, the Israelis kept records of the honor killings, which came to the attention of the Israeli police.

A number of brave Muslim women are speaking against this barbaric practice, such as Riffat Hassan, an activist who founded the International Network for the Rights of Female Victims of Violence in Pakistan. An Islamic theologian, she effectively speaks for women’s rights, especially regarding honor killings. Hassan courageously appeared on the ABC news program Nightline in February 1999 to address this “misogynistic” practice.[5] Although this extreme application of shari’a is not common in every Islamic country, it does occur. In countries like Iran, women who suffer rape are executed for bringing disgrace upon their families.

Like the Halachic concept of tsniyut (modesty laws), Shari’a law prescribes a dress-code for women they must adhere to. The hijab varies from one Muslim culture to another. Under the Taliban, CNN filmed a special documentary called, “Inside Afghanistan: Behind the Veil.” The film depicts an undercover female reporter who secretly documents the daily life of the Afghani women under the oppressive Taliban. While she covered her face a thick veil, she found life to be almost impossible. If she accidentally revealed her face or ankles, she could have been arrested.[6]

Even more conservative Muslim regimes like Iran and the Persian Gulf states have similar public dress codes that a woman must adhere to or face corporeal punishment. A woman who fails to conform to the local standard of hijab is likely to be punished severely. Worse, she brings disgrace on her family in the eyes of her community in a culture where honor is closely bound up with the virtues of modesty and purity. The standards extend from dictates about wearing the hijab to laws regulating behavior toward men. Often a woman is forbidden even to look at a man other than her husband or an immediate family member. Remember one rule: In the Middle East, people kill over honor. This is a tradition that stretches back to the earliest periods of recorded history.

Whether it be in the Mullacracy of Iran, or the Sheikdoms of the Middle East, or for that matter—in the streets of Jerusalem and Beth Shemesh. Women are dehumanized and reduced to sex objects by the men of their society. If you ever wanted to understand what Radical Islam and Ultra-Orthodoxy have in common, it is a mutual misogyny of women. No woman can define her identity apart from her husband, family, or community.

The war between Radical Islam and the West is fighting for control of our soul and our freedom. Radical Islam is not interested in peaceful coexistence. As Jews, we are also experiencing a similar problem in Israel, whenever we see Haredim attack women they perceive as, “immodestly dressed.” The Ultra-Orthodox wish to transform Israel into a theocracy. Although there is little we can practically do to change the overall situation, change is incremental. Supporting women’s groups that protect the rights of women, whether they be Muslim women’s groups or Jewish women’s groups—adding our voice to theirs may eventually produce the changes millions of women yearn to see in that troublesome part of the world.

Remember: One person can change the world. However, the power of two or more, can effect an even greater change! Continue Reading

Did King David Really Sin with Bathsheba?

After reading Neil N. Winkler’s new book, “Bringing the Prophets to Life: A Timely Look at a Timeless Story” (Jerusalem: Gefen, 2011), I felt elated. Somebody in the Orthodox world has finally written a book on the Prophets! The study of the Tanakh remains one of the most neglected areas of Jewish study in the yeshiva world today. The study of the Babylonian Talmud remains as popular as ever. The 12th century French Talmudist (and grandson of Rashi), Rabbanu Tam writes, “Nowadays, the study of the Babylonian Talmud has become the dominant focus of study. The early generations of scholars dedicated a third of their time studying the Scriptures.”[1]

Today, Artscroll, Judaica Press, Moznaim have translated a number of fine Orthodox works on the Tanakh, but tend these commentaries have a distinct medieval style that is unsuited for the 21st century. Winkler’s “Bringing the Prophets to Life: A Timely Look at a Timeless Story,” breaks away from these rather dull translations and expositions; he introduces a more conceptual approach to engaging and cross-examining the biblical texts most yeshiva students seldom ever study.

In the interest of brevity, I will focus on his treatment of King David and his affair with Bathsheba.  For me, this particular biblical story deals with the humanity of David that is fascinating. The author discusses the Talmudic view, expressed by Rabbi Judah HaNasi, “Anyone who says King David ‘sinned,’ is simply mistaken” (BT Shabbat 56a). Admittedly, Winkler agrees that the Talmudic perspective is counterintuitive. After all, David does sleep with a married woman; he orders his general to leave Uriah, Bathsheba’s husband, exposed and unprotected in the midst of a raging battle. Talmudic interpretation argues that Uriah provided his wife with a religious divorce (a.k.a., a “get”) prior to his departure to the battlefield. Ergo, Bathsheba wasn’t really, “married,” but happened to be “halachically” divorced. (It’s a good thing King David didn’t have the Israeli Rabbinate advising him!!)

Winkler wonders: “With this clear declaration, our rabbis set forth a challenge to all traditional biblical scholars and students: How can we understand the story of David and Bat-Sheva as found and implied in the text in light of the Talmud’s declaration? Did David not sin at all despite ample references to his sin in the text? What were the rabbinical giants of the past conveying to the future generations?” (p. 108). After explaining the obvious and more straight forward meaning of the text, Winkler admits, “This is certainly not the David who is so God-sensitive  and moral, the David who is so close to his men and his nation, the David we have gotten to know in the course of the twenty chapters . . .

Ok, we get it. David’s behavior doesn’t exactly strike one as “kosher.”

Winkler considers a number of possible expositions to the exegetical problem he poses. One approach suggests that the Talmudic statement is more of a “midrashic” homily, not to be taken literally. According to this reading, David’s behavior is simply, “beyond our ability to understand.” Maybe this is the kind of answer might satisfy the gullible yeshiva students, but it doesn’t satisfy people who live in the real world. Fortunately, Winkler rejects this tasteless approach. Besides, everybody knows King David had a passion for pretty ladies.  David almost committed adultery wth Abagail, but fortunately for him–her husband died! David immediately proposes to Abagail, immediately after Nabal’s death! (cf. 1 Samuel 25:40-42.)

Surprisingly, Winkler argues that David did not actually commit adultery, for if he did—he would have been worthy of the death penalty. However, he is guilty of a “moral trespass.” By the standard of Gentile kings, David does nothing “wrong,” but God expects a higher standard from His anointed.

Sorry Rabbi, that statement doesn’t wash. Archaeological background might have helped Winkler on his last point. Adultery was not considered an acceptable form of behavior of any Semitic king in the ancient world! In Genesis 20:9, the Philistine King Abimelech refers to adultery as חֲטָאָה גְדֹלָה  “the great sin.” When Joseph tried to persuade Madaam Potifar to stay away, he tells her that adultery  is הָרָעָה הַגְּדֹלָה “great evil.” It is obvious that adultery is a sin–even by the standard of Gentile Kings!!

Ancient Israel’s disdain for adultery is consistent with the social attitudes  found among Israel’s neighbors.  For example: unearthed texts from Ugarit [2] and Egypt refer to adultery as a, “great crime.”[3]  The ancients regarded adultery not as a crime against a life-partner, but as a sin against the gods.  The protection of the integrity of the family unit was important because the family is the foundation of society. I will admit, Winkler’s comments probably describe the outrageous behavior of Roman emperors a lot better, but the Semitic kings of the ancient Near East had much higher ethical standards.

Winkler’s proofs are interesting—but certainly debatable! (1)  The prophet Nathan never criticizes David for having committed adultery. Rather, he criticizes David for arranging Uriah’s death.  (2)  When David confesses his sin, he carefully says, “I have sinned to God,” i.e., he did not commit a sin against Bat Sheva. As further proof, Winkler cites the verse, “Against you, you alone, have I sinned, and done what is evil in your sight . . .” Finally, Winkler cites a third biblical passage where the biblical narrator briefly alludes to “the matter of Uriah the Hittite” (1 Kgs. 15:5) and never makes mention of this incident again.

Oy, Rabbi Winkler has studied way too much pilpul (hair-splitting  Talmudic sophistry). Why must we defend every outlandish rabbinic statement? Since when are the Talmudic Sages infallible beings? Some of the rabbis thought Rebekah was 3 years old when she first met Isaac, or that the giant Og, hitched a ride on Noah’s ark. Some comments are just plain silly and are not oracles from Sinai.

Abarbanel’s commentary (ca. 15th century), offers a stinging criticism of King David—and represents a view that Winkler ignored.

  • Rabbi Judah HaNasi’s words are nothing more than a Midrashic homily, hardly requiring a response. I can easily excuse Rabbi Judah’s words, for he was a descendant from David [4], and was not really truthfully speaking . . .  The Scriptures reveals all the sordid details of his illicit affair for all to see, and if David did not “sin,” how could he say, “I have sinned to the LORD”? Why did he go out of his way to repent in the most appropriate manner, as the verse attests, “Against you, you alone, have I sinned, and done what is evil in your sight . . .” (Psa. 51:5)? . . . I cannot and will not contradict the Scriptures on this matter! Rebbe’s opinion that “King David’s soldiers all issued a religious divorce to all of his soldiers, in the event they died in war” is simply not warranted by the text, for King David says to Uriah, “You have just come from a journey. Why did you not go down to your house? . . .(2 Sam. 11:10).  . . . I would rather say King David truly sinned, and he truly repented and suffered greatly until he finally obtained atonement.

As a shepherd, David’s job was to take care of God’s flock—and not molest it. This is the entire point of the pastoral parable Nathan the Prophet gently conveyed to King David (2 Samuel 12:1-6). Nathan spoke respectfully to the King, and did not need to catalog each sin David committed in detail because he felt David had some redemptive potential.

Abarbanel’s commentary is important because he demands that we–the reader–be blatantly honest with the text. In addition to Abarbanel’s text, there is an interesting Mishnah that speaks about moral accountability. “If a person sends forth fire in the hands of a deaf-mute, an idiot or a minor he is not liable by the laws of man, but he is liable by the laws of Heaven.” [5] Ordinarily, if a person makes someone a proxy to do something wrong, the person who commits the crime is responsible (this obviously not so with an American court!). It is surprising the Talmudic teachers never thought to include David’s plot to kill Uriah as part of the Talmudic discussion. I suspect the rabbis did not wish to tarnish King David or his descendant, Rabbi Judah HaNasi. If anything, the story of Uriah proves that a man can still be guilty if he sent somebody to commit a heinous crime. Admittedly, my exposition does turn the rabbinic position on top of its head, but what else is a postmodernist (like myself) supposed to do?

In the final analysis, each person is answerable to God for one’s actions. This principle does not apply to someone who is irresponsible, but in the case of a King, the text makes it abundantly clear that the King is morally responsible if he delegates someone to commit mayhem in his name.

King David’s and King Ahab provide an interesting study in contrasts. Ahab covets “Naboth’s vineyard. The evil Jezebel uses a ruse to get Naboth killed for, “cursing the God and the King,” and poor Naboth is executed and his vineyard is confiscated (1 Ki 21:5-16). At first, Ahab’s behavior seems more forgivable, since he did not know about Jezebel’s conspiracy to get rid of Naboth. However, everything changes when he goes along with Naboth’s execution! Elijah condemns Ahab (and Jezebel’s) behavior and boldly says, “You shall say to him, “Thus says the Lord: Have you killed, and also taken possession?” You shall say to him, “Thus says the Lord: In the place where dogs licked up the blood of Naboth, dogs will also lick up your blood” (1 Ki 21:5-16). Naboth never shows any remorse for his behavior, much like Saul.

Winkler makes a fine distinction between King Saul, who denies all responsibility when the prophet confronts him, vis-à-vis King David, who soon acknowledges responsibility, once he is confronted by the evidence and truth—the mark of an honest leader. Throughout the Bible, God always uses weak people to achieve His purpose. David may be powerful on the battlefield, but his home life is a complete mess! I think many American families can easily relate to David’s foibles and humanity.

In contemporary terms, Bill Clinton’s affair with the young White House intern, Monica Lewinsky is a perfect illustration of a leader who denies moral culpability, especially when the whole nation confronts him with the evidence and truth. How can any modern Bible teacher not use such a fantastic illustration? The situation with Newt Gingrich’s infidelity is a bit more complicated, especially because he claims he has repented.

Who knows? Every saint has a past, and every sinner has a future.

Winkler’s book accomplishes his goal quite well. His book creates a dialogue. Intrabiblical texts offer a wonderful way to compare and cross examine well-known biblical narratives, which Winkler does a fine job weaving various passages together in making his points. I am sure the author hopes the conversation he has initiated shall move beyond the ideas he proposes in his book. No author can hope for anything more. In his next book, Rabbi Winkler may want to follow the style Nechama Leibowitz developed in her weekly parsha studies. All and all, Rabbi Winkler’s book held my interest. Continue Reading

Today’s Pretenders of Talmudic Piety

The Neturei Karta cannot bear looking at the face of a woman—whether a real woman, or merely the image of a woman’s face, which they find “erotic.”

The philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas observed that the face is the only part of the body that we see in all of its nakedness. Lévinas develops this thought:

• Access to the face is straightaway ethical. . . . There is first the very uprightness of the face, its upright exposure, without defense. The skin of the face is that which stays most naked, most destitute. It is the most naked, though with a decent nudity. It is the most destitute also: there is an essential poverty in the face; the proof of this is that one tries to mask this poverty by putting on poses, by taking on a countenance. The face is exposed, menaced, as if inviting us to an act of violence. At the same time, the face is what forbids us to kill. (Ethics and Infinity 85-86).

The human face is God’s mirror; it is the reflection of our deepest humanity. It is capable of infinite expressions; emotions reveal the essence of our souls. How could we disrespect the one part of our neighbor’s humanity, whose countenance commands without words? The Ultra-Orthodox cannot look at a woman’s face, because to do so they would have to respect her humanity. Unfortunately, they do not see a human being with feelings, hopes and dreams. All they see is a sexual object to tantalize their forbidden thoughts and imagination. Nothing is more dehumanizing.

One prominent Orthodox rabbi, Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, decided to blot out the picture of Ruti Fogel, who was brutally murdered in the West Bank settlement of Itamar, along with her husband and children. Rabbi Aviner’s yeshiva, Machon Meir, publish some of the finest books in Judaic scholarship. It is a halachically progressive school. On the cover of the Machon Meir Newsletter, they blotted out her picture—allegedly, “out of respect.”

What kind of person gets sexually excited when seeing the image of a murder victim? Where is the “respect” in this kind of “halachic” ruling? The Machon Meir Yeshiva has actually dishonored someone who has died a Kiddush HaShem.

Somebody asked me the other day, “What is the Talmudic source for the Haredi ban on the woman’s face?” I thought about it. Actually, there is some antecedent in the Talmud. The Sages wondered, “What constitutes indecent exposure with respect to the She’ma prayer?” The Rabbis grappled with this issue:

R. Isaac said, “Anyone who gazes at one handbreadth of skin belonging to a married woman, constitutes sexual arousal.” Another rabbi said, “Even gazing at a woman’s pinky, constitutes indecent exposure. R. Hisda says, “Even a woman’s exposed leg constitutes indecent exposure.” Samuel said, “Even a woman’s voice constitutes indecent exposure!” (BT Berachoth 24a).

As strange as this Talmudic passage may seem to most of us, remember: the rabbis were concerned solely with a man’s intention, when uttering the She’ma. None of the rabbis prescribed burkas for the women of their community; nor did they tell their followers not to “look” at a woman.

Today’s Ultra-Orthodox acts more out of a sense of hubris; they believe that they are as pious as the rabbis were in the days of yore.

The Hasmonean King Alexander Jannaeus actually offers his Queen Salome some practical advice that one would not expect to hear, “King Jannai said to his wife’, ‘Fear not the Pharisees and the non-Pharisees. Beware of the hypocrites who ape the Pharisees; because their deeds are as immoral as Zimri’s; yet, they expect a reward like Phineas” (BT Shabbat 16b). Continue Reading

Early Rabbinic Reflections on Capital Punishment (Part 1/2)

There can be no doubt rabbinic tradition took a dim view of capital punishment. Mishnahic law required that those accused be warned by witnesses immediately before they commit the offense, and that they acknowledge such warning—a clear indication of the rabbinic distaste for capital punishment, explicitly found elsewhere.[1] Life imprisonment did exist for cases that could not technically be legally prosecuted, even though the evidence left no room for doubt[2]; such a person had to subsist on sparse diet of barley bread and water, and the Talmud indicates the criminal usually died from starvation. There may be a Scriptural allusion to this practice: the prisoner was condemned to eat “the bread of misfortune and the water of distress” (Isa. 30:20). Other rabbinic statements express even greater ambivalence:

  • R. Yose says, “Under no circumstances is one put to death unless both witnesses against him have given warning to him,” as it is said, ‘At the testimony of two witnesses’ (Deut. 7:6).”[3] He whose trial ended and who fled and was brought back before the same court—they do not reverse the judgment concerning him and retry him. He whose trial ended and who fled and was brought back before the same court—they do not reverse the judgment concerning him and retry him . . . A Sanhedrin which imposes the death penalty once in seven years is called murderous. R. Eleazar b. Azariah says, “Once in seventy years.” R. Tarfon and R. Akiba say, “If we were on a Sanhedrin, no one would ever be put to death.”[4] Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says, “So these Sages would multiply the number of murderers in Israel.”[5]

Moreover, the defendant may not be put to death unless two (or in some cases three) eyewitnesses testify against him or her.  Each witness must be so certain of his testimony that he personally would be willing to carry out the execution.  A passage from Deuteronomy 19:13-21 asserts that a plotting witness is subject to the same punishment as the defendant—including, presumably, death. Although the Torah prescribes the death penalty in the case of adolescent rebellion (i.e., “the rebellious son” of Deut. 21:18-21), the Sages admit, “Such a case never occurred, and it never will happen.” The entire passage is heuristic, so, “That you may study [the Torah for its own sake] and receive reward.”[6] The rabbinic angst and reticence to implement the death penalty, and its alternative system of imprisonment is of great relevance for modern biblical scholars and laity.

Rabbinic law is pretty straightforward about such cases. Maimonides writes, “The following rules apply when two groups of witnesses offer conflicting testimonies. If one witness from one group came together with one witness from the other group and they both delivered testimony concerning another matter, the testimony is of no consequence for it is obvious that one of them lied, but we cannot ascertain which one.”[7]Likewise Maimonides also notes, “Should a court err with regard to a case involving capital punishment and convict an innocent person, ruling that he is guilty, and they discover a rationale that would require that the ruling be nullified and he be vindicated, they nullify the ruling and retry the case. If the Court erroneously ruled and acquitted a person liable to be executed, then the judgment is not nullified and the case is not retried.”[8]

According to the Jerusalem Talmud, if one of a hundred witnesses is declared invalid, the entire testimony is rejected.[9]This was certainly the case here, and in a Jewish court, Troy Davis would never have been executed on this basis alone, and would have probably even been set free. Beyond this point, if the judge suspects the witnesses are indeed lying, he must refuse to render a decision upon the basis of their evidence (cf. Isa. 11:3-4).[10] Unlike American civil law that allows known criminals to testify in court against an alleged murderer, Rabbinic law prohibits the testimony of criminals either because they have zero credibility in rabbinical law and a valid witness is not even allowed to be associated with a dishonest witness.[11]

Continue Reading