Rabbi Michael Leo Samuel

Does God really have a “memory”? If we say that God indeed has a “memory,” are there times when God also “forgets,” or is absent-minded? From a Maimonidean perspective, such a metaphor must be understood in terms of negative theology, i.e., to say that God has a “memory,” this is simply another way of saying that God is not indifferent to our existence. With this thought in mind, let us examine the verse in Genesis 8:1:

8:1 וַיִּזְכֹּר אֱלֹהִים אֶת־נֹחַ וְאֵת כָּל־הַחַיָּה וְאֶת־כָּל־הַבְּהֵמָה אֲשֶׁר אִתּוֹ בַּתֵּבָה - But God remembered Noah and all the wild animals and all the domestic animals that were with him in the ark. – Like all other anthropomorphisms, the concept of God’s “memory” is a distinctively human way of saying that God is “mindful” of Creation; such language is really spoken from the human perspective for the Torah speaks in the language of humankind. God’s memory is the basis of life. This ancient intuition when narrated from the human perspective depicts a time when humanity and the animal world coexisted at the dawn of creation. It was this paradisiacal image of a world that lived in harmony that evoked God’s “memory.”[1] From a metaphysical perspective, every fiber of the cosmos exists continuously as a figment of God’s consciousness, hence is an immortal part of God’s cosmic “memory.”

Ramban limits the metaphor of God “remembering” as pertaining to humankind and not to the kingdom of animals. God’s “remembrance” pertains to something capable of attaining virtue because animals have no moral freedom; they are remembered not for their own sake, but for the sake of humankind.[2] To say “God remembered Noah and all the wild animals and all the domestic animals that were with him in the ark” means that God remembered His plan that the world should continue with the same varieties of animal life that it had before.

Ramban’s reasoning is consistent with his anthropocentric theological belief that God’s concern centers on humankind, and not nature — a view which Maimonides rejects.[3] One must really question the internal logic of Ramban’s thesis. Many biblical passages indicate that God’s “memory” is gratuitous in nature, and it is not always conditional upon human choice or behavior; moreover, it extends bio-centrically through all Creation. God’s memory for the animal kingdom stems from the love God feels toward His creatures: “Your righteousness is like the mighty mountains, your justice like the ocean depths. You care for people and animals alike, O Lord” (Psa. 36:7, MT).

Indeed, many of the various laws in the Torah aim at preventing unnecessary suffering of God’s creatures. Thus we find in the Book of Jonah how Jonah discovered that part of God’s reticence to destroy the city of Nineveh was because of the animal population that dwelled there (Jonah 4:11).

Ramban’s observation also goes against one Midrashic view that purports that God saved humankind because of the animal world—that were it not for the animal world, humankind would have been doomed to extinction![4] In the same chapter, the Midrash points out that the idea of God’s “remembering” humankind and animals alike is found in Psalm 145:9: “The LORD is good to all, and his compassion is over all that he has made.”

R. Joshua b. Levi paraphrased this as: The Lord is good to all, and His tender mercies are over all, because they are His works. R. Samuel b. Nahman interprets “The LORD is good to all, and his compassion is over all that he has made,” is because it is His nature to be compassionate (Gen. Rabba 33:3).

Notes:

[1] Commentaries past and present debate what may have precipitated God’s “memory.” Ibn Ezra sees in this passage an allusion to the covenant God had made earlier with Noah (6:18). Cassuto takes exception to Ibn Ezra’s view that remembrance is expressly associated with the covenant (6:18) for the verse does not say that “He remembered the covenant that He made with Noah” but rather “God remembered Noah . . .”

[2] Ramban’s commentary differs from Rashi who felt that animals are in some small measure “morally” accountable for their behavior.

[3] Ramban wrote, “The sundry laws pertaining to preventing cruelty towards animals were legislated not because God was concerned with the pain of the animal world, but in order to teach humanity the importance of acting mercifully towards Creation.” Ramban’s view stands in stark contrast with Maimonides, who argues that these precepts aim to help humankind become more sensitive to the pain of animals (Guide 3:26, 48). Maimonides notes: “It is prohibited to slaughter an animal with its young on the same day. This is in order that people should be constrained and discouraged from slaughtering them in such a manner that the young is slain in the sight of its mother, for the pain animals experience is considerable. There is no difference whether it is man or animal alike, for the love and tenderness a mother shows its young is not a matter of intelligence — it is instinctual and emotional. Not only does this faculty exist in humankind, it also is the endowment of most creatures. . . .” In a long polemic, Ramban took Maimonides to task, observing “So too, what the Rabbis have stated (BT Berakhot 33b), ‘Because he treats the ordinances of God like expressions of mercy, whereas they are decrees,’ i.e., it was not a matter of God’s mercy extending to the bird’s nest or the dam and its young, since His mercies did not extend so far into animal life as to prevent us from accomplishing our needs with them, for if that were so, He would have forbidden slaughter altogether. But the purpose for the prohibition [against taking the dam with its nest or against killing the dam with its young in one day] is to teach us the trait of compassion and that we should not be cruel” (Commentary to Deut, 22:6, Chavel’s translation).

[4] “It is not for your sake but for the sake of the cattle, as it is written, “You save humans and animals alike, O LORD,” i.e., You save humans for the sake of animals alike, O LORD. R. Judah b. R. Simon referred the verse to Noah (Gen Rabbah 33:1).